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THE NEED FOR CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
MARIJUANA POLICY 
CYNTHIA S. DUNCAN 
 
The Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1970.  Since that time, 
billions of dollars have been spent enforcing marijuana prohibition and 
millions of individuals have been arrested.  Despite these efforts, there has 
been little to no success in controlling the availability of marijuana.  
Federal and state efforts to reduce marijuana production and use through 
prohibition have been ineffective, and those efforts have been far less than 
equitably applied across economic and racial divisions.  Given the costs 
associated with prohibition and the meager results obtained thus far, it is 
time to rethink the national policy of prohibition and consider abandoning 
the nearly forty-year-old model. 
Thirteen states have decriminalized possession of small amounts of 
marijuana for personal use, and many more states have greatly reduced 
the penalties for possession.  Decriminalization carries with it many of the 
same societal costs associated with total prohibition and does nothing to 
dismantle illegal trafficking operations.  Legalization, on the other hand, 
would eliminate the criminal supply network and would also remove the 
direct and collateral sanctions that currently fall so harshly upon minority 
and low-income marijuana users.  This Note explores legalization of 
marijuana within a system of regulation and taxation.  It compares the 
efficiency, fairness, and political and administrative feasibility of a policy 
of legalization to both federal prohibition and state-level 
decriminalization.  The purpose of this Note is not to conclusively 
determine that legalization is the best policy, but to demonstrate that it is a 
viable alternative deserving of serious consideration in any marijuana 
policy debate. 
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 THE NEED FOR CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA 
POLICY 
CYNTHIA S. DUNCAN∗ 
We therefore urge the country to commence an open and 
honest debate about marijuana prohibition. . . . At a 
minimum, this debate will force advocates of current policy 
to show that prohibition has benefits sufficient to justify the 
cost to taxpayers, foregone tax revenues, and numerous 
ancillary consequences that result from marijuana 
prohibition.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Attitudes toward marijuana use and marijuana prohibition are 
changing.  Although the federal government, through the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA), has classified marijuana as a Schedule I 
substance—the highest of five levels of control2—efforts at the state, local, 
and federal levels are changing the legal landscape of personal marijuana 
use.  Two recently introduced congressional measures would remove any 
federal penalties “for the possession of marijuana for personal use, or for 
the not-for-profit transfer between adults of marijuana for personal use” 
and would reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II substance.3  Thirteen states 
have already passed laws decriminalizing possession of small amounts of 
marijuana, treating first-time possession of small amounts like a minor 
traffic violation, and many more states have greatly reduced the penalties 
                                                                                                                          
∗ University of Colorado, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 
2009.  I would like to thank Professor Peter Siegelman for his invaluable comments and guidance, 
without which this Note would not have been possible.  I am also grateful to Lynn Kelly for her 
suggestions and encouragement.  This Note is dedicated to my husband and children for their constant 
love and support.  Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 ProhibitionCosts.org, An Open Letter to the President, Congress, Governors, and State 
Legislatures, http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/endorsers.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (signed by 
Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman and over five hundred economists).  These economists “believe such 
a debate will favor a regime in which marijuana is legal but taxed and regulated like other goods.”  Id. 
2 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)–(c) (2006) (providing a comprehensive list of controlled substances 
grouped by level of control, from Schedule I (highest) to Schedule V (lowest)). 
3 Act to Remove Federal Penalties for the Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible Adults, H.R. 
5843, 110th Cong. (2008) (removing federal penalties for both possession of one hundred grams or less 
of marijuana and not-for-profit transfer between adults of an ounce or less); Medical Marijuana Patient 
Protection Act, H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008) (moving marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II of 
the CSA and providing “for the medical use of marijuana in accordance with the laws of the various 
States”). 
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for possession.4  In addition, more and more municipalities, including 
several large metropolitan areas, have voted to make enforcement of the 
laws prohibiting possession of small amounts of marijuana the very lowest 
priority for their law enforcement officials.5 
The laws addressing the use of medical marijuana are also being eased.  
As a Schedule I substance, marijuana is considered to have “no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States” and, under the 
CSA, is not allowed to be prescribed by medical practitioners.6  In 
contradiction of this federal statute, thirteen states have removed criminal 
sanctions from medical use, and currently thirty-one states and the District 
of Columbia have, either by legislation or voter initiative, some form of 
law recognizing the value of medical marijuana.7  While it is true that 
                                                                                                                          
4 See David Abel, Marijuana Law Advocates Seek Wider Change, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2008, 
at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File (noting that Massachusetts joins Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, and Oregon in having passed laws decriminalizing marijuana, making “getting caught with less 
than an ounce of marijuana punishable by a civil fine of $100”); see also Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., 
Risks and Prices: The Role of User Sanctions in Marijuana Markets 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 13415, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13415.pdf 
(noting that in addition to states that “are generally recognized as having ‘decriminalized’ possession of 
small amounts of marijuana, fifteen states have actually eliminated criminal sanctions associated with it 
and another twenty-six states have conditional discharge provisions for first time offenders”). 
For the purposes of this Note, decriminalization refers to a policy of removing criminal penalties 
for possession of small amounts of marijuana but retaining criminal sanctions against trafficking. 
The definition of the term small amount can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but most often 
refers to an amount of marijuana with a total weight less than one ounce.  See, e.g., Abel, supra; 
Valerie Richardson, Denver Makes Pot Possession Lowest Priority, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, at A9, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES File.  The federal bill, introduced by Rep. Barney Frank, 
would decriminalize possession of 3.5 ounces or less.  Abel, supra. 
5 See Richardson, supra note 4 (noting that passage of pro-marijuana initiative in 2007 made 
Denver “the 10th community in the nation,” joining such cities as San Francisco, Oakland, and Seattle, 
“to place low-level . . . possession at the bottom of its law-enforcement priorities”).  This was the 
second pro-marijuana initiative approved by Denver voters in the past three years.  Id.  Ironically, the 
first initiative, in 2005, resulted in an increase in marijuana arrests.  Id.  The difference between the two 
measures, according to Mason Tvert, executive director of the group behind both initiatives, is that the 
2005 measure was an amendment to an existing ordinance.  “‘This time, we actually created an 
affirmative law telling the city to take specific action, and they’ll be violating the law if they ignore it,’ 
Mr. Tvert said.  ‘The voters have made it clear they don’t want people arrested for marijuana 
possession.’”  Id. 
Since the passage of the pro-marijuana initiative in 2007, Denver’s city attorney has adopted a 
new rule allowing “[a]dults cited for possessing less than an ounce of marijuana” to pay their citations 
through the mail instead of having to appear in court.  Felisa Cardona, Marijuana-Fine Process Eased 
for Adults, DENVER POST, May 30, 2008, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, DPOST File. 
6 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2006); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (“The CSA 
designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule 
I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses.”). 
In Raich, the Court held that enforcement of the prohibition on possession and cultivation of 
medical marijuana fell within the federal commerce powers even where such activity was purely 
intrastate and undertaken “in accordance with state laws.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 28–29. 
7 MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/SBSR_NOV2008.pdf; Glenn Kessler, 
California Voters Narrowly Approve Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2008, at A44, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (noting that in the 2008 election “Massachusetts 
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federal prohibition trumps any state or local measure,8 in defiance of 
federal prohibition,9 an increasing number of state and local governments 
are creating laws that allow for the personal use of marijuana—medically, 
recreationally, or both. 
The Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1970.10  Since that time, 
billions of dollars have been spent enforcing marijuana prohibition at the 
local, state, and federal levels.11  Despite this expenditure, there has been 
little to no success in controlling the availability of marijuana.12  Given 
these facts, combined with a growing tolerance of recreational and medical 
marijuana use, it is time to rethink the national policy of prohibition and 
consider abandoning the nearly forty-year-old model. 
Marijuana trails only alcohol and tobacco as the most popular 
recreational drug in America.13  The Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) estimates that one hundred million Americans (over forty 
percent of the population) have tried marijuana in their lifetimes and that 
nearly fifteen million (almost six percent of the population) used marijuana 
in the past month.14  What is the goal of the current federal policy 
                                                                                                                          
voters decriminalized possession of small amounts of the drug, eliminating criminal penalties for 
people caught with an ounce or less of marijuana” and “Michigan joined 12 other states in allowing the 
use of marijuana by very ill patients to relieve pain, nausea, appetite loss and other symptoms”). 
8 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 (“The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any 
conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.”); John Coté, FBI Seizes 50 Pounds of 
Pot, Hash in Raids, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 30, 2007, available at LEXIS, News Library, SFCHRN File 
(“California approved medical use of marijuana more than a decade go [sic], but it is still illegal under 
federal law.”). 
The Court in Raich, while expressing sympathy and understanding for California’s efforts to 
allow for the legal use of medical marijuana by its citizens, found it beyond doubt “that federal power 
over commerce is ‛superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their 
inhabitants,’ however legitimate or dire those necessities may be.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 9, 27–29 & 
nn.37–38 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)). 
9 See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Cal., Attorney General Lockyer 
Issues Statement On US Supreme Court’s Medical Marijuana Ruling (June 6, 2005), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=546 (“Today’s ruling shows the vast philosophical 
difference between the federal government and Californians on the rights of patients to have access to 
the medicine they need to survive and lead healthier lives.  Taking medicine on the recommendation of 
a doctor for a legitimate illness should not be a crime.”). 
10 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006)). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part II.A.1; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL: 
OBSERVATIONS ON ELEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, NO. GAO/GGD-97-42, at 
4 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97042.pdf [hereinafter GAO DRUG 
CONTROL] (“Despite some successes, United States and host countries’ efforts have not materially 
reduced the availability of drugs in the United States . . . .”). 
13 NORML.org, About Marijuana, http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=7305 (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2009). 
The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) is a nonprofit, public-
interest lobby that “supports the removal of all criminal penalties for the private possession and 
responsible use of marijuana by adults, including the cultivation for personal use, and the casual 
nonprofit transfers of small amounts.”  NORML.com, FAQ’s, http://norml.org/index. 
cfm?Group_ID=3418 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) [hereinafter NORML FAQ’s]. 
14 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MARIJUANA 
FACTS & FIGURES: EXTENT OF USE, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/marijuana/ 
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prohibiting all use of marijuana?  Is it to make criminals of those 
individuals?15  Or is the goal to educate the public about potential risks 
associated with using marijuana and to direct efforts toward deterring use, 
especially among the young?  The purpose of this Note is to show that the 
goals of education and deterrence could be more effectively pursued 
through a policy of full legalization, regulation, and taxation of marijuana 
than through the current policy of marijuana prohibition.16 
Those opposed to any relaxation of the marijuana laws maintain that 
marijuana is extremely harmful and addictive, with no medically 
therapeutic use.17  However, decades of evidence show that the harmful 
and addictive properties have been greatly exaggerated.18  This is perhaps 
                                                                                                                          
marijuana_ff.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).  In comparison, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention estimates current alcohol use at 60.8% of adults and current cigarette use at 20.8% of adults.  
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, 
UNITED STATES, 2008, at 305 tbl.68 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf; 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING & 
TOBACCO USE, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/tables/adult/table_2.htm (last visited Feb. 
28, 2009). 
15 See Frontline: Busted: America’s War on Marijuana (interview with Professor Mark Kleiman 
conducted Winter 1997–1998) (PBS television broadcast), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/dope/interviews/kleiman.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Kleiman 
Interview] (“Marijuana is the most widely-used illicit drug, and the illicit drug most likely to be used 
by respectable folks . . . . There are millions of employed, hard-working and productive Americans who 
are, by the definition of our current law, illicit-drug users.  And so when people go on TV and say drug 
users are bad people and we should shoot them all, they’re referring to a lot of people they know.”); 
WashingtonWatch.com, H.R. 5843, The Act to Remove Federal Penalties for the Personal Use of 
Marijuana by Responsible Adults, http://www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/110_HR_5843.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (“So long as the users aren’t harming anyone, it is extremely offensive to 
brand them as criminals and force them to live in fear.”). 
16 See NORML FAQ’s, supra note 13 (“In recent years, we have significantly reduced the 
prevalence of drunk driving and tobacco smoking.  We have not achieved this by prohibiting the use of 
alcohol and tobacco or by targeting and arresting adults who use alcohol and tobacco responsibly, but 
through honest educational campaigns.”). 
17 See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESEARCH 
REPORT SERIES: MARIJUANA ABUSE 5 (2005), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/ 
RRMarijuana.pdf [hereinafter NIDA RESEARCH REPORT] (describing potential health risks associated 
with marijuana use, including increased risk of lung disease and some cancers); Letter from Keith B. 
Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. John Conyers, 
Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 2–3 (July 25, 2008), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Nelson080725.pdf (claiming “there are no data from adequate 
and well-controlled clinical trials to support any of the claimed therapeutic uses for smoked 
marijuana”). 
18 See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 256 (1992) 
(“[M]illions of persons who started smoking marijuana as college students in the late 1960s, some of 
whom have been taking the drug more or less regularly ever since, have suffered neither obvious 
immediate damage nor dramatic aftereffects. . . . [I]f occasional marijuana smoking over [decades] 
carried substantial health risks, the evidence should have started to come in by now.”); Sid 
Kirchheimer, Heavy Marijuana Use Doesn’t Damage Brain: Analysis of Studies Finds Little Effect 
from Long-Term Use, WEBMD, July 1, 2003, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/ 
20030701/heavy-marijuana-use-doesnt-damage-brain (citing results of fifteen different studies, 
conducted over periods of three months to thirteen years, involving 700 regular marijuana users and 
484 non-users, that showed “[l]ong-term and even daily marijuana use doesn’t appear to cause 
permanent brain damage”).  “[R]esearchers found only a ‘very small’ impairment in memory and 
learning among long-term marijuana users.  Otherwise, scores on thinking tests were similar to those 
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most evident when marijuana is looked at in comparison with other 
substances, including legally available alcohol and tobacco, which are 
more addictive.19  In addition, a report by the Institute of Medicine shows 
that marijuana has therapeutic value for a number of medical conditions,20 
and support for medical marijuana is growing throughout the medical 
community.21 
The increasingly tolerant attitude toward marijuana may be attributed 
in part to changes in what we thought we knew.  Commonly held 
misconceptions about marijuana have been refuted.22  One such 
misconception is that marijuana is a gateway drug—that marijuana use 
alone leads to the use of “harder drugs.”23  It is, however, not marijuana 
use that leads to harder drugs,24 but the method of acquisition.25  As long as 
                                                                                                                          
who don’t smoke marijuana . . . . [R]esearchers say impairments were less than what is typically found 
from using alcohol or other drugs.”  Id. 
19 See DIV. OF NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INST. OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND 
MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 98 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter INST. OF 
MEDICINE] (noting that “few marijuana users develop dependence,” marijuana users “appear to be less 
likely to [develop dependence] than users of other drugs (including alcohol and nicotine), and 
marijuana dependence appears to be less severe than dependence on other drugs”); Kleiman Interview, 
supra note 15 (“[C]annabis is the most widely used illicit drug, precisely because its negative impact on 
most users tends to be much smaller than the impact of cocaine or methamphetamine.”). 
20 See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 177 (“For patients such as those with AIDS or who 
are undergoing chemotherapy, and who suffer simultaneously from severe pain, nausea, and appetite 
loss, [marijuana-derived] drugs might offer broad-spectrum relief not found in any other single 
medication.”); see also Scientists Are High on Idea that Marijuana Reduces Memory Impairment, 
RESEARCH NEWS, Nov. 19, 2008, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/endocan.htm (reporting on 
research at Ohio State University indicating specific elements of marijuana could “help prevent or 
delay the onset of Alzheimer’s disease”).  But cf. INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 179 (cautioning 
that smoking marijuana should only be used for short-term treatment or for terminally ill patients and 
strongly urges research to develop a non-smoked rapid-onset delivery system). 
21 See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 7, at app. P (providing a “Partial List of 
Organizations with Favorable Positions on Medical Marijuana,” including many state medical 
associations, as well as the American Medical Association, which supports medical marijuana research 
and endorses a “physician’s right to discuss marijuana therapy with a patient”). 
22 See 1 OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, UNITED NATIONS, 2006 WORLD DRUG REPORT: ANALYSIS 
156 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf [hereinafter 
U.N. WORLD DRUG REPORT] (“It is true that much of the early material on cannabis is now considered 
inaccurate, and that a series of studies in a range of countries have exonerated cannabis of many of the 
charges levelled against it.”); KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 253–64 (providing examples of 
misconceptions that have been refuted such as “substantial health risks” and “vastly increased 
potency”). 
23 See DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR., RAND, RESEARCH BRIEF: USING MARIJUANA MAY NOT 
RAISE THE RISK OF USING HARDER DRUGS (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/research_briefs/RB6010/RB6010.pdf (“[T]he harms of marijuana use can no longer be viewed as 
necessarily including an expansion of hard-drug use and its associated harms.”); KLEIMAN, supra note 
18, at 259–61 (“The gateway hypothesis is not the only plausible relationship between marijuana use 
and the use of other drugs.”). 
24 See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 99–101 (“In the sense that marijuana use typically 
precedes rather than follows initiation into the use of other illicit drugs, it is indeed a gateway drug.  
However, it does not appear to be a gateway drug to the extent that it is the cause or even that it is the 
most significant predictor of serious drug abuse; that is, care must be take not to attribute cause to 
association.”). 
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marijuana remains illegal, the only way to acquire it for recreational use is 
by purchasing it from someone willing to commit a crime by selling it.  
Such individuals often provide access to harder drugs.26  The government 
now warns that “[u]sing marijuana puts children and teens in contact with 
people who are users and sellers of other drugs,” and this contact increases 
the “risk that a marijuana user will be exposed to and urged to try more 
drugs.”27 
Research has shed new light on marijuana.  Sixty percent of states 
endorse some form of medical marijuana protection, and there is a growing 
reluctance to criminalize possession for personal recreational use.28  Why 
then is there still such strong continuing resistance to legalization?  The 
answer, of course, is that marijuana is far from harmless.29  While less 
addictive than other substances, both legal and illegal, with which it is 
often grouped, marijuana is still an addictive substance—though much less 
so than alcohol and tobacco.30  Those who oppose legalization are 
concerned that relaxing prohibition could lead to increased use, especially 
among children.31  In fact, the primary focus of much opposition is that 
                                                                                                                          
25 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 261 (noting that although heavy marijuana users in a 1970s 
study were at an increased risk of becoming heroin users, it was not marijuana use but association with 
drug sellers that led to the increased risk). 
26 See id. at 261 (noting that in a study of adolescents “heavy marijuana use appeared to generate 
involvement in drug selling, either as a way of paying for the marijuana consumed or simply by 
association with drug sellers, and drug selling in turn gave adolescents access to heroin and to the 
money to buy it”).  “This suggests that marijuana was a gateway for these adolescents only because it 
was illicit.”  Id. at 261–62. 
27 NAT’L INS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MARIJUANA: FACTS FOR 
TEENS 10–11 (2008), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/TEENS_Marijuana_brochure.pdf 
(responding to the question, “Does marijuana lead to the use of other drugs?”). 
28 Felisa Cardona, Election 2007: Marijuana Enforcement: Denver Puts Pot Busts on Cops’ Back 
Burner, DENVER POST, Nov. 7, 2007, at B5, available at LEXIS, News Library, DPOST File (quoting a 
Marijuana Policy Project spokesman as saying, “These sorts of measures in cities and towns across the 
country have an unbroken winning streak, and it’s looking like that streak is continuing, and that’s a 
sign that voters around the country don’t want police time and effort wasted on small-time marijuana 
enforcement.”). 
29 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 254; see INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 126 (“Marijuana is 
not a completely benign substance.  It is a powerful drug with a variety of effects.”). 
30 See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 94–95 (“Compared to most other drugs . . . , 
dependence among marijuana users is relatively rare.”); KLEIMAN, supra note 18, 41–42 (noting that 
capture ratios of marijuana, crack and powder cocaine, alcohol, and tobacco, are all well above ten 
percent, with marijuana’s being lowest at just under fourteen percent, alcohol over seventeen percent, 
and tobacco the outlier at fifty-nine percent).  The capture ratio of a substance is “the proportion of [its] 
users who go on to compulsive use.”  Id. at 41. 
31 See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 126 (“[T]here is the broad social concern that 
sanctioning the medical use of marijuana might lead to an increase in its use among the general 
population.”); Robert Robb, Opinion, It’s Time to Consider Legalizing Marijuana, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Oct. 5, 2007, at 7, available at LEXIS, News Library, ARIZRP File (“Despite the claims of incautious 
legalization advocates, usage would undoubtedly go up as prices dropped, product became more 
available and convenient, and risks disappeared.”); Jerry Seper, DEA Raids Medical Marijuana 
Centers, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A9, available at LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES File (noting 
that DEA agents justify raiding medical marijuana distribution centers in California because, as one 
DEA special agent claims, the “establishments are nothing more than drug-trafficking organizations 
bringing criminal activities to our neighborhoods and drugs near our children and schools”). 
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legalization would send the wrong message to children and would 
encourage them to try marijuana by making it more readily available.32  
Those who support an end to prohibition argue that a policy of legalization 
may actually help deter use, especially underage use.33  In light of the 
ongoing debate on prohibition, and with opposition to marijuana from a 
purely moral standpoint starting to recede,34 the time has come to 
reconsider this country’s policy on marijuana under a more objective 
framework. 
The prohibition of drugs is a public policy matter, and the decision to 
legalize marijuana would require a radical change in that policy.  To 
evaluate whether such a change in policy is desirable, it is necessary to 
examine the benefits and costs of both the current prohibition policy and a 
policy of legalization utilizing regulation and taxation.  Public policy most 
often involves the allocation of resources, and conversely, “[a]ll resource 
allocation decisions are shaped by public policy.”35  Microeconomic policy 
analysis involves the study of these allocative choices made by the 
government and provides a means of evaluating alternatives.36  The extent 
to which the current system of marijuana prohibition has been successful in 
preventing abuse of the substance must be weighed against any benefits 
derived from removing the criminal sanctions associated with recreational 
and medical use.  In microeconomic policy analysis, the evaluation criteria 
are not limited to efficiency but include equity and fairness, political 
feasibility, and administrative feasibility.37  Such an analysis can be used to 
evaluate alternative public policies for marijuana and determine whether 
the resources currently dedicated to achieving goals through prohibition 
could be more effectively utilized to achieve those same goals through an 
alternative policy of legalization and regulation.  This Note demonstrates 
through such an analysis that a public policy of legalization and regulation 
                                                                                                                          
32 See Teen Drug Abuse: Marijuana Use Among Teens, http://www.teendrugabuse.us/ 
marijuana.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (“Teens get a mixed message about marijuana, but the 
message needs to be clear.  Marijuana is an illegal substance that affects teens in many harmful 
ways.”). 
33 See Rob Kampia, If Tobacco Regulation Works, Why Not Regulate Marijuana?, ALTERNET, 
Dec. 24, 2007, http://www.alternet.org/story/71504/ (noting that, while marijuana use is up across all 
age groups, cigarette smoking has declined, especially among teenagers, perhaps in response to 
increased enforcement of laws prohibiting sales of cigarettes to minors).  Rob Kampia is the founder 
and executive director of the Marijuana Policy Project.  ProCon.org, Medical Marijuana, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/viewsource.asp?ID=1669 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
34 See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND PROHIBITION 
POLITICS 152 (2004) (“One of the first places to focus official attention is on the spreading incredulity 
of government-created moral panic.”); Steven E. Landsburg, Op-Ed., What to Expect When You’re 
Free Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A23, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File 
(“Public policy should not be designed to advance moral instincts that we . . . reject every day of our 
lives.”). 
35 LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 3, 6 (2002). 
36 Id. at 4. 
37 Id. at 13. 
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of the sale and distribution of marijuana is preferable to the current policy 
of prohibition. 
Part II of this Note examines the current public policy and evaluates 
the various methods of enforcement and prevention used in the prohibition 
of marijuana.  The costs and benefits, as well as the successes and failures, 
of those methods are analyzed.38  Prohibition and legalization represent 
opposite ends of a broad spectrum of possible marijuana policies.  Along 
that spectrum lie any number of systems involving some degree of 
decriminalization while prohibiting trafficking, such as allowing medical 
use only, allowing possession of various quantities for personal use, or 
allowing cultivation and possession for personal use.  One point along that 
spectrum is the system currently evolving in this country—decriminalizing 
possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use while 
maintaining criminal sanctions for sale and distribution.  Strict prohibition 
is still the law, at least at the federal level; yet prohibition is at best an 
inconsistent policy at state and local levels—in terms of both regulation 
and enforcement—with states and localities having varying degrees of 
prohibition and decriminalization.39  This evolving system shares many of 
the characteristics of prohibition, but there are differences.  In light of the 
growing support for decriminalizing possession for personal use, Part III 
evaluates those differences. 
Part IV explores legalization of marijuana within a system of 
regulation and taxation.40  This Note evaluates the probable effects of such 
regulation and taxation.41  The benefits derived from removing the criminal 
sanctions associated with the distribution and possession of marijuana are 
weighed against any social costs associated with a possible increase in 
marijuana use resulting from the removal of those sanctions. 
This Note concludes by summarizing the efficiency, fairness, and 
political and administrative feasibility of the proposed policy of 
legalization, comparing that policy to both federal prohibition and the 
                                                                                                                          
38 Marijuana is not the only drug subject to prohibition.  In many instances, reported data 
encompasses more than one prohibited drug, and facts and figures pertaining only to marijuana are not 
available.  Where such information is not readily available, the data is extrapolated and estimated as it 
pertains to marijuana only. 
39 NORML.org, State by State Laws, http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4516 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009) (follow each state link to table outlining that state’s various marijuana penalties). 
40 The government can exert a great deal of influence over behavior through regulation and 
taxation.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 7 (detailing a wide range of areas and behaviors influenced 
by government regulation and taxation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX 
L. REV. 1, 24 (2006) (including regulation of private sector activity as one of three goals of taxation).  
“[I]f the goal of the government is to deter consumption of certain items (for example, alcohol, tobacco 
or gasoline), excise taxes on these items are the most effective way of achieving this aim . . . .”  Id. 
41 See J. David Hawkins et al., Preventing Substance Abuse, 19 CRIME & JUSTICE 343, 344–45 
(1995) (noting that research into the effects high taxes and other restrictions have on reduction of 
alcohol consumption “suggest[s] that legal regulation remains an important tool in drug abuse 
prevention for ‘legal’ drugs”). 
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currently evolving system of state and local decriminalization, and 
ultimately determining that legalization is a viable alternative deserving of 
serious consideration in any marijuana policy debate.  Public policy must 
conform to existing law, and a radical change in public policy concerning 
marijuana would necessitate an equally radical change in the law, but “in 
the long run, the law should conform to good policy.”42 
II.  PROHIBITION: THE FEDERAL MARIJUANA POLICY 
The laws prohibiting marijuana and the system administering that 
prohibition have been in place for over thirty-five years;43 therefore, the 
administration and political feasibility of prohibition do not require a great 
deal of analysis here.  The more important criteria regarding prohibition 
are the efficiency and fairness of the system.44  Are prohibition’s goals of 
reducing the production and use of marijuana being effectively pursued?  
How efficiently have the resources invested in prohibition been utilized?  
How equitably are the programs and methods of deterrence and 
enforcement being administered?  This Part demonstrates that the efficacy 
of federal and state efforts to reduce marijuana production and use through 
prohibition has been poor and that the administration of those efforts has 
been far less than equitably applied across economic and racial divisions. 
Over the last four decades, the federal government has committed 
billions of budgetary dollars to the prohibition of illegal drugs, and the 
annual budget for prohibition grows every year.45  For 2009, the President 
                                                                                                                          
42 FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 15. 
43 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, enacted on October 27, 
1970, established five schedules of controlled substances and included marijuana among those 
substances subject to the strictest control.  Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202(a)–(c), 84 Stat. 1236, 1247–49 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)–(c) (2006)).  See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: A 
TRADITION OF EXCELLENCE 1973–2003, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ 
pubs/history/history_part1.pdf [hereinafter DEA HISTORY] (“[T]he Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) was created in 1973 to deal with America’s growing drug problem.”). 
44 Efficiency can be thought of “as using resources to maximize the value to the economy’s 
members of the goods and services produced.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 30–31. 
Of the criteria, fairness is particularly important if, as many claim, prohibition is enforced with 
great disparity across racial lines.  See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Reports Find Persistent Racial Gap in Drug 
Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at A21, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting 
that “large disparities persist in the rate at which blacks and whites are arrested and imprisoned for drug 
offenses, even though the two races use illegal drugs at roughly equal rates”).  Although blacks make 
up only one-eighth of the population, one-third of those arrested for drug violations in 2006 were black, 
and a report from the Human Rights Watch indicates that in 2003 “blacks constituted 53.5 percent of 
all who entered prison for a drug conviction.”  Id.  Black men “are nearly 12 times as likely to be 
imprisoned for drug convictions as adult white men.”  Id.  While these figures include arrests for all 
illegal drugs offenses, more than eighty percent of these arrests “were for possession of banned 
substances, rather than for their sale or manufacture,” and the latest FBI data indicates that “[4] in 10 of 
all drug arrests were for marijuana possession.”  Id.  The racial disparity in marijuana prohibition is 
addressed more thoroughly below.  See infra Part II.B. 
45 See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L 
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 2009 BUDGET SUMMARY 13 tbl.3 (2008), available at http://www. 
whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/09budget/fy09budget.pdf [hereinafter ONDCP BUDGET] 
 
 1712 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1701 
requested a national drug control budget of $14.1 billion, a 3.4% increase 
over the drug control budget enacted for 2008.46  Of course, spending for 
marijuana prohibition represents only a portion of the budgetary total for 
control of all illegal drugs.  This Part addresses that portion of the total 
drug control budget directed toward prohibition of marijuana and examines 
how effective the efforts supported by this funding have been in achieving 
the goals of prohibition. 
The federal government does not break down budgetary expenditures 
by specific drug; therefore, it is necessary to estimate the amount spent 
targeting marijuana alone.  The Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) reports that in 2007 the final amount committed by the federal 
government to the national drug control policy was $13.8 billion.47  The 
Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition, a report funded by the 
Marijuana Policy Project, estimates that in 2002 nineteen percent of the 
total amount budgeted by the federal government for all illegal drug 
prohibition was devoted to marijuana prohibition.48  Assuming this 
percentage has not changed appreciably, this translates to $2.6 billion 
committed to marijuana prohibition at the federal level in 2007.  These 
figures do not include expenditures at the state and local levels.  The same 
report estimates total state and local expenditures for marijuana prohibition 
at $5.3 billion for 2003.49  Even assuming that figure has remained 
constant year-to-year, the estimate for total current expenditures for 
prohibition of marijuana alone, at all government levels, is approximately 
$8 billion per year.50 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the agency charged 
with managing and coordinating the drug prohibition activities of agencies 
                                                                                                                          
(indicating annual drug control funding ranging from $10.8 billion to $13.8 billion for FYs 2002–2007, 
with the final budget of each year exceeding that of the previous year). 
46 Id. at 1. 
47 Id. at 13 tbl.3. 
48 See Daniel Egan & Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition, in 
POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION 17, 25 & tbl.2.3 (Mitch Earleywine ed., 
2007) (estimating percentage of FY 2002 budget devoted to marijuana prohibition based on marijuana 
arrests and convictions as percentage of total DEA drug arrests and convictions, with adjustments for 
revenue received from seizures and fines).  For a complete explanation of the estimating process used 
to arrive at the nineteen percent figure, see id. at 24–25 & 35 nn.16–21. 
The Marijuana Policy Project (MPP) is a lobbying organization that believes “the greatest harm 
associated with marijuana is prison,” and therefore “focus[es] on removing criminal penalties for 
marijuana use, with a particular emphasis on making marijuana medically available to seriously ill 
people who have the approval of their doctors.”  MPP.org, http://www.mpp.org/about/ (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2009). 
49 Egan & Miron, supra note 48, at 24 (estimating figure for FY 2003 based on percentage of 
states’ arrests, convictions, and incarcerations attributable to marijuana in 2000 (with adjustments for 
revenue received from seizures and fines) and adjusting for inflation).  For a complete explanation of 
how this figure was calculated, see id. at 18–24. 
50 Because enforcement activities vary considerably at the state and local levels, see supra notes 
4–5 and accompanying text, this Note focuses on how effectively the federal expenditures are being put 
to use. 
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at the federal level; coordinating and cooperating with enforcement 
officials at the federal, state, and local levels; and at the international level, 
acting as liaison with the United Nations and Interpol on matters relating to 
international drug control programs.51  The DEA is only one of many 
federal programs included in the national drug control strategy,52 but it 
accounts for one-seventh of the total federal drug control budget.53  As the 
administrative agency spearheading the federal government’s drug control 
strategy, the DEA’s success or failure in achieving its goals can be seen as 
a strong indicator of the success or failure of the federal government’s 
overall drug policy.  As the following section shows, despite spending 
billions of dollars a year to reduce marijuana production and use, the DEA, 
and its fellow federal, state, and international agencies, have had little to no 
effect on either. 
A.  Efficiency and Effectiveness 
The DEA’s stated mission is to “enforce the controlled substances laws 
and regulations of the United States” and bring to justice those 
organizations “involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled substances” in the United States.54  “Another mission of the 
DEA is to discourage drug use among the U.S. population by sharing 
information about the risks of drug use and the effects of drugs on 
society.”55  Enforcement represents efforts to reduce the supply of illegal 
drugs, whereas education and prevention programs are directed at reducing 
the demand.56  Currently, the federal government spends almost twice as 
much on enforcement as it does on education and prevention.57  The 
following sections will show that the DEA’s missions are not succeeding, 
and that neither the supply nor the demand for marijuana is being reduced 
in proportion to the money being spent. 
                                                                                                                          
51 DEA Mission Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009). 
52 The Department of Justice (DOJ) is one of twelve government agencies included in the national 
drug control strategy, and the DEA is one of four DOJ programs within that strategy.  ONDCP 
BUDGET, supra note 45, at 12 tbl.2 (agencies receiving drug control funding). 
53 See id. (noting DEA allocations for 2007, 2008 (enacted), and 2009 (requested) budgets 
represent 14.2% of 2007 budget and 15.4% of both 2008 and 2009 budgets). 
54 DEA Mission Statement, supra note 51. 
55 Just Think Twice: A Guide to Using the Just Think Twice Website for Middle and High School 
Students 1 (Teacher’s Guide), available at http://www.justthinktwice.com/pdf/just_think_twice_guide_ 
hi.pdf (“The Just Think Twice teacher’s guide was developed . . . under a contract from the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).”). 
56 ONDCP BUDGET, supra note 45, at 1. 
57 The ONDCP reports that, in 2007, of the $13.8 billion committed by the federal government to 
support the DEA’s missions, sixty-five percent was devoted to supporting the DEA’s enforcement 
mission, with the remaining thirty-five percent going to discourage drug use through education and 
prevention programs.  Id. at 13 tbl.3; cf. id. at 1 (referring to the sixty-five percent of the budget 
directed to enforcement as augmenting the thirty-five percent allocated to prevention). 
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1.  Enforcement58 
As previously noted, the missions of the DEA include both 
enforcement of “the controlled substances laws and regulations of the 
United States” and discouraging drug use through education.59  In 2007, 
just under $2 billion of the total $13.8 billion budget was allocated directly 
to the DEA, with only $3.2 million (less than one-quarter of one percent) 
of that allocation going to drug use prevention.60  Thus, it is abundantly 
clear that the primary focus within the agency itself is enforcement of the 
drug prohibition laws aimed at reducing the supply of illegal drugs.61  By 
the government’s own assessment,62 the DEA is failing to make an impact 
on that supply. 
In its most recent assessment, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB)63 assigned the DEA an overall rating of “adequate,” scoring the 
agency one hundred percent for its purpose, but only twenty-six percent for 
results.64  “The 2004 assessment found that [the] DEA was unable to 
demonstrate progress in reducing the availability of illegal drugs in the 
United States.”65  The assessment found that there was a lack of specificity 
of targets and timeframes for achieving strategic goals and objectives and 
that “DEA managers were not held accountable for achieving results.”66  
The DEA is the “principle agency responsible for enforcing the Nation’s 
drug laws,” charged with preventing and deterring the manufacture and 
                                                                                                                          
58 This section addresses federal enforcement efforts aimed at reducing the availability of 
marijuana by targeting both foreign and domestic production.  State and local efforts to reduce 
availability by targeting individual users are addressed below in Part II.B. 
59 See supra text accompanying notes 51, 55. 
60 See ONDCP BUDGET, supra note 45, at 91. 
61 See id. (noting that “Intelligence” and “Investigations” together comprise over eighty percent of 
the DEA budget). 
62 The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was developed by the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to assess and improve the performance of federal programs.  OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ASSESSING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).  “It is used to evaluate a program’s 
purpose, design, planning, management, results, and accountability to determine its overall 
effectiveness.”  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PROGRAM 
ASSESSMENT RATING TOOL (PART), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
For a comprehensive spreadsheet of PART assessments for all government programs, access 
either the Excel or PDF file hyperlink available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/index.html. 
63 The “OMB’s predominant mission is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the 
federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive Branch agencies. . . . OMB evaluates the 
effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands 
among agencies, and sets funding priorities.”  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, OMB’S MISSION, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization/role.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2009). 
64 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PROGRAM ASSESSMENT 
RATING TOOL: PROGRAM SUMMARIES 254 (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
budget/fy2005/pdf/ap_cd_rom/part.pdf [hereinafter PART SUMMARIES]. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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distribution of controlled substances, but by the federal government’s own 
assessment standards, it is failing to produce a noticeable reduction in 
illegal drug availability.67 
The OMB’s assessment addresses the failure of DEA efforts to reduce 
the supply of all illegal drugs, including marijuana.  The evidence 
regarding the effect the DEA is having upon the supply of marijuana 
specifically is just as discouraging.  Over a million kilograms of marijuana 
were intercepted along the southwest border in 2007.68  Mexico alone 
produces more than ten times that amount, “primarily for export to the 
United States.”69  And although a significant amount of marijuana enters 
the country from outside operations, the problem is no longer simply 
stopping drug trafficking organizations from smuggling marijuana across 
the nation’s borders, but preventing them from maintaining their entire 
operations within the borders. 
The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) reports that there has 
been a sharp rise in domestic production of marijuana since 2000, and 
especially so after the increase in border security following the events of 
September 11, 2001.70  The “[r]ising law enforcement pressure . . . has not 
yet stemmed the increase in domestic cannabis cultivation,” and factors 
such as “direct access to local drug markets . . . and higher profit margins 
for domestically grown marijuana . . . have contributed to a continued 
increase in domestic cannabis cultivation.”71  An estimated seven million 
plants72 were eradicated domestically in 2007.73  This eradication amount is 
                                                                                                                          
67 Id.  “Clearly what we have been doing has not worked.”  Mark Lander, Clinton Says Demand 
for Illegal Drugs in the U.S. ‘Fuels the Drug Trade’ in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at A6, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in a 
“discussion of America’s fitful war on drugs” during a March 2009 visit to Mexico). 
68 NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 2009, at 21 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf 
[hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THREAT ASSESSMENT]. 
69 Id. at 22 (noting potential Mexican production of 15,500 metric tons, or over fifteen million 
kilograms, for 2007); see Solomon Moore, Border Proves No Obstacle for Mexican Cartels, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting that “[d]espite 
huge enforcement actions on both sides of the Southwest border, the Mexican marijuana trade is more 
robust—and brazen—than ever” and that “Mexican drug cartels routinely transported industrial-size 
loads of marijuana [across the border] in 2008”). 
70 NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC CANNABIS CULTIVATION 
ASSESSMENT 2007, at 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs22/22486/ 
22486p/22486p.pdf [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CANNABIS CULTIVATION].  This is attributed to the 
fact that more and more foreign drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are relocating their operations 
into the United States “to reduce the risk of marijuana seizure or loss during cross-border transport, 
gain direct access to local drug markets, and achieve higher profit margins for domestically produced 
marijuana” than otherwise possible.  Id. at 1. 
71 Id. at 2. 
72 The equivalent of 3.1 million kilograms, assuming each plant yields one pound, with 448 grams 
per pound.  Id. at 13. 
73 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 68, at 19 fig.13, 20 fig.14 (including 
6.6 million outdoor plants and nearly half a million indoor plants). 
 1716 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1701 
an increase of over one million plants from the previous year.74  
Nevertheless, the NDIC estimates that the amount eradicated domestically 
accounts for only thirty to fifty percent of the total domestically grown 
marijuana, with the remaining fifty to seventy percent escaping 
eradication.75 
Considerably more than half of the marijuana intended for U.S. 
consumption, whether produced domestically or brought across the 
borders, is reaching the U.S. illegal drug market.  Despite the billions spent 
on DEA-coordinated efforts to reduce the supply, “[m]arijuana continues 
to be the most widely used and readily available drug in the United States 
and it is the only major drug of abuse grown within U.S. borders.”76 
2.  Education and Prevention: The Impact on Underage Use 
As noted above, thirty-five percent of the total federal drug control 
budget goes toward discouraging drug use through education and 
prevention programs,77 and considerable effort is directed at preventing 
underage drug use.78  Substance abuse among teenagers is a very real and 
very serious concern, and every effort should be made to prevent and deter 
underage use.79  However, education and prevention programs that 
                                                                                                                          
74 Id. at 20 fig.14. 
75 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CANNABIS CULTIVATION, supra note 70, at 13.  The eradication represents 
efforts by the DEA Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program (DCE/SP), the Forest 
Service, and the Department of Interior.  Id. at 13.  The DCE/SP, initiated in 1979, is “the only 
nationwide law enforcement program that exclusively targets Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) 
involved in [domestic] cannabis cultivation.”  DEA, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Domestic Cannabis 
Eradication/Suppression Program, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/marijuana.htm (last visited Mar. 
6, 2009).  An unintended consequence of DCE/SP has been that “publicity about program successes 
such as arrests and seizures . . . promote market participation.  News about seizures of marijuana plots 
and grow rooms widely advertises the high prices and profit potential associated with the cultivation of 
high quality marijuana.”  Jon Gettman, Marijuana Production in the United States (2006), BULL. 
CANNABIS REFORM, Dec. 2006, at 16, http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/bcr2_index.html 
(follow “Entire Report” pdf hyperlink). 
76 ONDCP BUDGET, supra note 45, at 104; see Moore, supra note 69 (“[E]nforcement officials 
say they see no discernible reduction in the domestic supply.”). 
77 See supra note 57. 
78 Of the $14.1 billion requested for national drug control for 2009, $1.5 billion (just over ten 
percent) is earmarked for educational and outreach programs aimed specifically at preventing initiation 
into drug use, most notably underage drug use.  See ONDCP BUDGET, supra note 45, at 2–3 
(describing education and outreach programs aimed at preventing drug use in children).  In addition to 
these programs, $3.4 billion is dedicated “to drug intervention and treatment efforts . . . to help drug 
users in need” across all age groups.  Id. at 3–4. 
79 See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
MARIJUANA FACTS & FIGURES: HEALTH EFFECTS, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/ 
marijuana/marijuana_ff.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) [hereinafter MARIJUANA HEALTH EFFECTS] 
(reporting on research indicating that high school seniors who smoked marijuana more than seven 
times a week scored significantly lower on standardized tests than nonsmokers although the two groups 
had scored equally well when in fourth grade); Alain Joffe et al., Legalization of Marijuana: Potential 
Impact on Youth, 113 PEDIATRICS e632, e632–33 (2004), available at http://pediatrics. 
aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/113/6/e632 (noting consequences of acute and long-term use in 
adolescents can include “negative effects on short-term memory, concentration, attention span, 
motivation, and problem solving, which clearly interfere with learning”). 
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consistently fail to achieve results should be abandoned and replaced with 
programs proven to be more effective.80 
The ready availability of marijuana is especially troubling with respect 
to underage use.81  The most recent survey by Monitoring the Future82 
                                                                                                                          
80 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported on the establishment and 
effectiveness of at least two such programs: 
(1) In 1997, in response to an illegal drug problem that persisted despite “the federal 
government’s [annual] investment in the war on drugs [of] over $15 billion,” the GAO recommended 
two approaches to preventing drug use in school-age children.  GAO DRUG CONTROL, supra note 12, at 
1.  “The first approach emphasizes drug resistance skills, generic problem-solving/decisionmaking 
training, and modification of attitudes and norms that encourage drug use (the psychosocial approach).  
The second approach involves the coordinated use of multiple societal institutions, such as family, 
community, and schools, for delivering prevention programs (the comprehensive approach).”  Id. at 3. 
The most notable program using both of these approaches is the Drug Abuse Resistance 
Education (DARE) program.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, YOUTH ILLICIT DRUG USE 
PREVENTION: DARE LONG-TERM EVALUATIONS AND FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY EFFECTIVE 
PROGRAMS, NO. GAO-03-172R, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03172r.pdf.  
This non-government program is in over three-quarters of the nation’s school districts and is partially 
funded by the federal government.  Id. at 1, 4.  In 2003, the GAO reported that “six evaluations, 
conducted at intervals ranging from 2 to 10 years after the fifth or sixth grade students were initially 
surveyed, suggest[] that DARE had no statistically significant long-term effect on preventing illicit 
drug use,” and five evaluations found no significant differences in students’ attitudes about illicit drug 
use “between DARE and non-DARE students over the long term.”  Id. at 5.  Two of the evaluations, 
looking at short-term effects, “found no significant differences in illicit drug use between the 
intervention and control groups within a year after completing the DARE lessons.”  Id. at 7.  In the 
short-term, the DARE students did show “stronger negative attitudes about illicit drug use and 
improved peer pressure resistance skills and self-esteem about illicit drug use,” but “[t]hese positive 
effects diminished over time.”  Id. 
(2) The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign was created by Congress in 1998.  Office of 
Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y, Executive Office of the President, National Youth Anti-Drug Media 
Campaign, http://www.mediacampaign.org/about.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Anti-
Drug Media Campaign].  “Unprecedented in size and scope, the Campaign is the most visible symbol 
of the Federal government’s commitment to youth drug prevention.”  TheAntiDrug.com, http://www. 
theantidrug.com/NEWS/media-campaign-news.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).  Although the Anti-
Drug Media Campaign claims to have been effective in reducing teenage marijuana use, Anti-Drug 
Media Campaign, supra, in 2006 the GAO reported the results of a “well-designed and executed 
multiyear study of the impact of the ONDCP anti-drug media campaign on teen . . . drug use,” which 
“provide[d] no evidence that the campaign had a positive effect in relation to teen drug use;” in fact, the 
study indicated the campaign had unfavorable effects.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ONDCP 
MEDIA CAMPAIGN: CONTRACTOR’S NATIONAL EVALUATION DID NOT FIND THAT THE YOUTH ANTI-
DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN WAS EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING YOUTH DRUG USE, NO. GAO-06-818, at 6, 42 
(2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06818.pdf [hereinafter GAO MEDIA CAMPAIGN 
EVALUATION] (noting that “greater exposure to the campaign was associated with weaker anti-drug 
norms and increases in the perceptions that others use marijuana”).  In addition to this GAO report, the 
most recent PART assessments, see supra note 62, rated the Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign 
“Results Not Demonstrated”—the lowest possible rating, indicating that programs are not 
performing—and scored the program six percent for results.  PART SUMMARIES, supra note 64, at 414; 
see ExpectMore.gov, About Us, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/about.html (detailing 
PART ratings). 
81 See 1 LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON 
DRUG USE, 1975–2007, at 397 (2008), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/ 
monographs/vol1_2007.pdf (“[Young people’s] drug use is influenced by the availability of the . . . 
drugs.”). 
82 Monitoring the Future is an ongoing study of the behaviors and attitudes of American students 
and young adults, which is conducted by research scientists at the University of Michigan’s Institute for 
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reveals that eighty-four percent of twelfth grade students report that 
marijuana is “fairly” or “very” easy to obtain.83  This percentage has not 
changed significantly since the survey was first taken in 1975.84  “By this 
measure, marijuana has been almost universally available to American 
12th graders . . . over the past 32 years”—the same period of time the 
current drug policy has been in effect.85  While it can arguably be asserted 
that underage usage rates for marijuana absent the thirty-two years of 
prohibition might have approached those currently seen in legally available 
but age-restricted alcohol, it is difficult to envision that marijuana would 
have been more readily available to young people than it has been with 
prohibition in place.86  Enforcement efforts aimed at prohibiting all 
marijuana use have proven ineffective in reducing the availability of 
marijuana to teenagers.  But as discussed below, considerable progress can 
be made in reducing underage use of a substance by targeting the 
availability to potential underage users specifically. 
As with the enforcement budget, expenditures for education and 
prevention of drug use are not broken down by targeted substance.  
However, as the most prevalently used illegal substance among high 
school students,87 it can be assumed that marijuana receives a respectable 
share of the attention,88 as well as a commensurate amount of the 
funding.89  Usage rates, on the other hand, are broken down by substance.90  
Because the purpose of prevention and education programs is to reduce 
demand, especially among underage users, how the usage rates change 
over time can provide insight into the effectiveness of programs in 
reducing the demand for specific substances. 
Figure 1 illustrates the lifetime usage rates for alcohol, tobacco, 
                                                                                                                          
Social Research and funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, one of the National Institutes of 
Health.  Id. at 1. 
83 See id. at 409 (varying between eighty-three and ninety percent over the past thirty-two years).  
In addition, thirty-seven percent of eighth graders and sixty-nine percent of tenth graders said 
marijuana would be “fairly easy” or “very easy” to obtain.  Id. at 408. 
84 Id. at 409. 
85 Id.; see DEA HISTORY, supra note 43, at 4 (“[T]he Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
was created in 1973 to deal with America’s growing drug problem.”). 
86 See JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 81, at 106 tbl.4-2 (reporting underage usage rates for alcohol 
approximately twice that of marijuana across all categories and age groups). 
87 See id. at 208 tbl.5-5a (indicating underage rate of use for marijuana is consistently greater than 
rate of use for all other illicit drugs combined). 
88 See, e.g., Robert Hornik et al., Effects of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign on 
Youths, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2229, 2229 (2008) (noting Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign focus on 
marijuana, including introduction of Marijuana Initiative in 2002). 
89 See, e.g., GAO MEDIA CAMPAIGN EVALUATION, supra note 80, at 1, 42 (noting that Youth 
Anti-Drug Media Campaign, with an annual budget of more than $100 million, redirected its campaign, 
beginning in 2002, to concentrate on anti-marijuana messages). 
90 See JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 81, at 1, 3–4 (listing eleven separate classes of drugs, 
including alcohol and tobacco, initially included in the Monitoring the Future study, and noting the 
number of subclasses added since the study began over thirty years ago). 
 2009] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA POLICY 1719 
marijuana, and other drugs for one underage group.91  As can be seen from 
this graph, the use of all substances for this age group has declined over the 
past ten years.92 
 
Figure 1: 10th Grade Trends in Lifetime Prevalence of Use93 
 
Two important details in Figure 1 should be noted.  First, the decline in 
marijuana use parallels the decreases seen in the use of alcohol and other 
drugs.  Despite the focus placed upon reducing the use of marijuana in 
children, the decline in underage use of marijuana is not markedly different 
from that of alcohol or other drugs.94  Second, there has been a significant 
                                                                                                                          
91 Tenth grade students were chosen for this graph as representative of high school students.  
Monitoring the Future gathers information on eighth and twelfth grade students as well.  Id. at 1.  The 
data for these students reflects higher percentage rates for twelfth graders and lower rates for eighth 
graders across all substances, but both grade levels show similar declines in usage over the same time 
period as that shown here for tenth graders.  Id. at 39, 39 & 42–43 tbl.2-1. 
92 These decreases may “reflect an ongoing cultural shift among teens and their attitudes about 
smoking and substance abuse.”  Press Release, Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., NIDA Survey Shows a Decline in Smoking and Illicit Drug Use Among Eighth Graders 
(Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/newsroom/07/NR12-11.html [hereinafter NIDA 
Survey] (“Over the last decade, there has been a large science-based effort throughout the public health 
community to drive down the rates of smoking, illicit drug, and alcohol use among teens . . . . These 
[Monitoring the Future] results show us we are definitely seeing a decline in substance abuse among 
our youngest and most vulnerable teens, and we are committed to continuing our efforts.”) (quoting Dr. 
Elias A. Zerhouni, NIH Director). 
93 This graph represents data gathered by Monitoring the Future on the lifetime use of various 
substances by students in tenth grade.  JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 81, at 208, 208 & 210 tbl.5-5a. 
94 But see NIDA Survey, supra note 92 (“[I]n the past decade, there has been a slow downward 
trend in overall illicit drug use driven by gradual declines in marijuana smoking.”). 
 1720 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1701 
decrease in cigarette smoking among teens over the same time period.95  
This decline in use is attributed to a decrease in the availability of 
cigarettes, “very likely as a result of increased enforcement of laws 
prohibiting sale [of cigarettes] to minors.”96 
Age-indiscriminate prohibition of marijuana has not reduced the 
availability of marijuana to children.97  The focus on marijuana in 
education and prevention programs has not produced a noticeable 
reduction in marijuana use by children.  Continued funding of these 
programs under the banner of preventing underage marijuana use, when 
they have been ineffective in that regard, makes little sense.98  However, it 
appears that it is possible to effectuate a positive response in children 
through education coupled with prohibition that targets them exclusively.  
Stricter enforcement of the laws prohibiting the sale of cigarettes 
specifically to minors is credited with reducing the availability and thereby 
the use of cigarettes among teenagers.  The progress with underage 
cigarette use provides one alternative approach to reducing underage 
marijuana use by demonstrating what can be achieved through a system of 
legalization and regulation.  While there is no way of knowing if similar 
results could be attained if marijuana were also legally available and 
restricted by age, the cigarette data indicates that we might not be any 
worse off.99 
                                                                                                                          
95 See Press Release, Monitoring the Future, Teen Smoking Resumes Decline 1 (Dec. 11, 2007), 
available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pressreleases/07cigpr_complete.pdf [hereinafter Teen 
Smoking Press Release] (“The number of U.S. teens who smoke [cigarettes] has shown significant 
declines in recent years, particularly among those in their early teens.”). 
96 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 81, at 414; see Teen Smoking Press Release, supra note 95, at 3 
(reporting that “[i]t would appear that the efforts of many states and communities to get retail outlets to 
stop selling to underage smokers is having some success”).  There has been an accompanying decrease 
in the perceived availability of cigarettes, also “quite likely reflecting the impact of new regulations and 
related enforcement efforts aimed at reducing the sale of cigarettes to children.”  JOHNSTON ET AL., 
supra 81, at 30. 
97 With no strong incentive to differentiate between the ages of their customers, drug dealers do 
not discriminate by age.  See Kampia, supra note 33 (“Have you ever seen a marijuana dealer with a 
‘We Card’ sign?”). 
For a perspective on the overall problem of reducing marijuana availability, see Pacula et al., 
supra note 4, at 8 (“[I]t seems clear that marijuana markets function differently than that of cocaine and 
heroin markets. . . . [O]pen air markets and purchases from strangers are generally rare as compared to 
other drugs, suggesting that standard street methods of drug enforcement (undercover buys and 
patrolling the streets) might not be as effective at deterring marijuana transactions.”) (citations 
omitted).  The vast majority of marijuana transactions take place between friends.  Id. at 7–8. 
98 See, e.g., GAO MEDIA CAMPAIGN EVALUATION, supra note 80, at 1, 42 (noting program 
funding of over $100 million and “concentration on anti-marijuana messages”); id. at 6 (noting that 
“greater exposure to the [National Youth Anti-Drug Media C]ampaign was associated with weaker 
anti-drug norms and increases in the perceptions that others use marijuana”). 
99 In many categories surveyed, the usage rates for cigarettes have fallen to very near those of 
marijuana.  See JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 81, at 204, 204–05 tbl.5-3; 208, 208 & 210 tbl.5-5a; 217, 
217 & 219 tbl.5-5c (reporting results for various grade levels over several timeframes).  In one 
category, the usage rate for cigarettes in 2007 was below that of marijuana, 14.0% and 14.2% 
respectively.  Id. at 217, 217 & 219 tbl.5-5c (reporting trends in 30-day prevalence of use in tenth 
graders). 
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B.  Fairness and Equity 
Given the costs associated with prohibition and the meager results 
obtained thus far, there is ample evidence to conclude that we are wasting 
our money.  This section will show that the situation is far worse than 
merely a waste of resources.100  Drug policy in general, and marijuana 
policy in particular, falls most harshly and most unfairly on racial 
minorities and the poor.  Prohibition is not only ineffective, but highly 
inequitable as well. 
The racial disparity associated with overall drug enforcement is a 
serious issue.101  Blacks are arrested for drug abuse violations at a rate that 
is alarmingly inconsistent with the percentage of the overall population 
they represent.102  Although the Supreme Court has declared that there is 
                                                                                                                          
100 Marijuana arrests account for 47.4% of all drug arrests, with possession accounting for 42.1% 
and sale/manufacturing accounting for 5.3%.  FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2007: PERSONS ARRESTED, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/arrests/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2009).  This means that of the 1,841,182 individuals arrested in 2007 for drug abuse violations, 
775,138 were arrested for marijuana possession.  FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2007: PERSONS ARRESTED tbl.29, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2009).  These figures account only for arrests. 
It is often difficult to determine what percentage of possession convictions may be for simple 
possession because in many cases there are aggravating factors, such as a plea to a lesser charge of 
possession or a repeat offense.  See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, WHO’S REALLY IN PRISON FOR MARIJUANA? 15, available at http://www.whitehouse 
drugpolicy.gov/publications/whos_in_prison_for_marij/whos_in_prison_for_marij.pdf (noting other 
factors include concurrent sentences for other offenses, criminal history, committing violation while on 
parole, committing violation in designated drug-free zone).  But it is estimated that between ten and 
twenty-five percent of the persons in prison for a marijuana offense can be classified as low-level, or 
simple possession, offenders.  See Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The War on Marijuana: The 
Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s, HARM REDUCTON J., Feb. 2006, at 3, available at 
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-3-6.pdf (“One in four persons in prison 
for a marijuana offense . . . can be classified as a low-level offender.”); JustThinkTwice.com, Facts & 
Fiction, http://www.justthinktwice.com/factfiction/ourjailsarefull.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) 
(“According to the U.S. sentencing commission, of all drug defendants sentenced in federal court for 
marijuana offenses in 2003, only 10.3 percent  . . . were sentenced for simple possession.”). 
101 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING BLACKS: DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND RACE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/us0508/us0508 
webwcover.pdf (“Ostensibly color-blind, the US drug war has been and continues to be waged 
overwhelmingly against black Americans.”); Graham Boyd, The Drug War Is the New Jim Crow, 
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, July–Aug. 2001, at 18, 21 (“The drug war claims morality and 
protection of children as its goals, while turning a blind eye to the racial injustice it promotes. . . . We 
will one day understand that the war on drugs was a war on people and communities.”). 
102 Making up only thirteen percent of the U.S. population, blacks accounted for thirty-three 
percent of those arrested for drug violations in 2006.  Eckholm, supra note 44.  (In 2007, blacks 
accounted for thirty-five percent of those arrested.  Infra note 109.)  Blacks and whites overall use 
illicit drugs at roughly the same rates.  See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE 
AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES tbl.1.19B (2008), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k7NSDUH 
/tabs/Sect1peTabs1to46.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) [hereinafter SAMHSA DRUG USE TABLES] 
(reporting higher overall drug use percentage rates for whites for lifetime use and slightly higher rates 
for blacks for previous year and previous month use).  “Even if we were to double the 13 percent 
estimate of the number of blacks who may be drug offenders, the arrest figure is still disproportionately 
large.”  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 101, at 45.  This disproportion is not attributable to any 
difference in the rate at which blacks and whites traffic in illicit drugs.  See id. at 43 (noting that while 
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no constitutional right to be free from the disparate impact of facially 
neutral policies,103 there is widespread concern that the enforcement of 
facially neutral drug laws is anything but neutral.104  This concern is 
especially warranted with the enforcement of marijuana possession laws,105 
where the figures relating to black arrests are particularly disturbing.106  
                                                                                                                          
“[t]here is relatively little research on the demographics of drug sellers as such,” what data “is available 
suggests . . . that low-level drug sellers have a similar racial profile to drug users”).  Nor can the wide 
disparity in arrest rates between blacks and whites be fully explained by race neutral factors such as 
higher drug use rates, higher arrest rates, and larger black populations in urban areas.  Id. at 45–47; see 
id.at 46 (“Practical policing factors have played a role as well: drug transactions in poor minority 
neighborhoods are more likely to be in public spaces and between strangers, making it easier to 
undertake arrests . . . than it is in the bars, clubs, and private homes where drug dealing by whites is 
more likely to occur.”). 
103 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (“The Constitution does not require that a 
State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to 
operate a criminal justice system . . . .”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“[W]e have 
not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to 
pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion 
of one race than of another.”). 
104 See Boyd, supra note 101, at 18–22 (detailing the negative impact the drug war has had on the 
black population and comparing it to slavery, Jim Crow, and apartheid); Eckholm, supra note 44 
(noting that both then-Senator Barack Obama and then-Senator Hillary Clinton “strongly condemned 
the racial disparities in [drug] arrests and incarceration during their [2008 presidential] campaigns”).  
But see Heather Mac Donald, Is the Criminal-Justice System Racist?, CITY J., Spring 2008, at 12, 12, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, CITYJR File (arguing that while the “race industry and its elite 
enablers take it as self-evident that high black incarceration rates result from discrimination . . .  [t]he 
black incarceration rate is overwhelmingly a function of black crime”). 
105 It is argued that increased enforcement of low-level misdemeanor laws like marijuana 
possession helps to reduce overall crime, but research has failed to support this argument.  Jim Dwyer, 
On Arrests, Demographics, and Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at B1, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File; see, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken 
Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y, 165, 165–66 (2007) (finding “no good evidence that the [misdemeanor 
marijuana possession] arrests [in New York City] are associated with reductions in serious violent or 
property crimes in the city” and instead finding that “New York City’s marijuana policing strategy 
seems likely to simply divert scarce police resources away from more effective approaches that 
research suggests are capable of reducing real crime”).  Police officers interviewed in New York and 
other cities call these possession arrests “a waste of time,” noting that arresting and booking possession 
arrests keep them “off the street unable to engage in other police work” and that time spent “searching 
for and arresting people possessing small amounts of marijuana” means narcotics squads “are not 
available for other crime-fighting work.”  HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW 
YORK CITY 1997–2007, at 49 (2008), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST-
CRUSADE_Final.pdf.  “New York City’s marijuana possession arrests were not of people arrested for 
more serious crimes who were then found to be possessing marijuana.  In these arrests, marijuana 
possession was always the highest charge and often the only one.”  Id. at 5. 
106 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 105 (“[B]etween 1998 and 2007, the police [in New York City] 
arrested 374,900 people whose most serious crime was the lowest-level misdemeanor marijuana 
offense. . . . [Eighty-three] percent of those charged in these cases were black or Latino . . . . Blacks 
accounted for 52 percent of the arrests, twice their share of the city’s population.  Whites, who are 
about 35 percent of the population, were only 15 percent of those charged—even though federal 
surveys show that whites are more likely than blacks or Latinos to use pot.”); Jon Gettman, Marijuana 
Arrests in Massachusetts, BULL. CANNABIS REFORM, Oct. 2008, at 15–16, available at 
http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr6/bcr6_index.html (follow .pdf hyperlink) (reporting 
possession arrest rate for blacks in Massachusetts at nearly four times that of whites). 
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There are roughly six times as many whites as blacks in this country.107  
Both races use marijuana at approximately the same rates, which means 
that six times as many whites as blacks use marijuana;108 yet blacks make 
up a disproportionate percentage of those arrested for possession.109  This 
fact is most worrisome given that blacks are also convicted and sentenced 
at higher rates.110  From arrest to conviction, there is little doubt that 
marijuana prohibition unduly impacts minorities. 
Arrest and conviction for a marijuana offense are often not the worst 
punishments.111  Efforts have been made to reduce the harshness of 
sentences for marijuana offenses,112 but there is a wide range of collateral 
sanctions that are triggered by any conviction, whether felony or 
misdemeanor.113  Some collateral sanctions attach at arrest, whether or not 
there is a subsequent conviction.114  These sanctions can include: loss of 
professional licenses, barriers to employment opportunities, “loss of 
educational aid, driver’s license suspension, and bars on adoption, voting 
and jury service.”115  Collateral sanctions have a greater impact on the poor 
and on racial minorities.  Under federal law, anyone convicted of a felony 
                                                                                                                          
107 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE 2009 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 9 tbl.6, 
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009edition.html (follow Population hyperlink). 
108 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 101, at 41–42; see SAMHSA DRUG USE TABLES, supra 
note 102, at tbl.1.24B (reporting higher percentage rates for whites for lifetime marijuana use and 
slightly higher rates for blacks for previous year and previous month marijuana use). 
109 The FBI reports that blacks account for thirty-five percent of those arrested for all drug abuse 
violations.  FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2007: PERSONS ARRESTED 
tbl.43, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_43.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).  Applying the 
same thirty-five percent figure for overall drug arrests to marijuana possession arrests would mean that 
of the more than 775,000 arrests for marijuana possession in 2007, see supra note 100, more than 
270,000 of those arrested were black. 
Compare Eckholm, supra note 44 (reporting on the theory that “it made sense for police to focus 
more on fighting visible drug dealing in low-income urban areas, largely involving members of 
minorities, than on hidden use in suburban homes, more often by whites, because the urban street trade 
is more associated with violence and other crimes and impairs the quality of life”), with King & Mauer, 
supra note 100, at 15 (arguing that “[s]uch strategies result in substantially increased numbers of low-
level marijuana arrests, with little evidence that they are actually effective in suppressing other criminal 
behaviors”). 
110 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 101, at 48–49 (detailing factors that lead to harsher 
arrest rates and sentencing for blacks); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 105, at 165 (noting that in New 
York City blacks arrested for marijuana use are twice as likely to be convicted as whites and four times 
as likely to be sentenced to extra jail time). 
111 “[M]any marijuana offenders are surprised to find that the sentence actually imposed by the 
judge pales in comparison to the severity and long-lasting social and legal consequences that follow 
from conviction.”  RICHARD GLEN BOIRE, CTR. FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS, LIFE SENTENCES: 
THE COLLATERAL SANCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MARIJUANA OFFENSES 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/pdf/col_sanc_pdfs/report_narrative.pdf.  The legal research for this 
report was funded by the Marijuana Policy Project. 
112 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
113 BOIRE, supra note 111, at 4; see id. at 4–5 (“A person convicted of growing marijuana (a 
felony in most states) is often subjected to the same, and sometimes greater, collateral sanctions as a 
person convicted of murder, rape, or robbery.”). 
114 See id. at 8, 16 (noting that an arrest can result in a bar from public housing and a denial of 
employment). 
115 Id. at 2. 
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“which has as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a 
controlled substance . . . shall not be eligible” for food stamps or 
“assistance under any State program funded under . . . title IV of the Social 
Security Act.”116  The duration of the loss of assistance can be limited by 
state law, but the federal statute sets no limit, meaning the ban on 
assistance can be a lifetime ban.117  In addition, any marijuana conviction 
can lead to eviction from public housing.118  These collateral sanctions do 
not discriminate.  Those individuals convicted of low-level possession are 
subject to many of the same collateral sanctions as those convicted for 
dealing in large quantities.119  The loss of public assistance, or any sanction 
that interferes with the ability to work or to drive, can have a more 
burdensome impact on low-income and minority individuals. 
The ban on public assistance is not the only collateral sanction that 
may target low-income and minority individuals more harshly.  Students 
convicted of any offense, under either state or federal law, “involving the 
possession or sale of a controlled substance” while they are receiving any 
federal student aid under the Higher Education Act (HEA) lose their 
eligibility “to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance” for at least a 
year; in the case of a second conviction for selling, eligibility for aid is lost 
for life.120  This is a softening of the original provision, which was 
amended to include only those drug convictions that occur “while a student 
is enrolled and receiving federal financial aid.”121  Prior to being amended, 
the loss of student aid applied to any conviction, either before or during 
                                                                                                                          
116 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2006).  The assistance affected includes the “[p]rogram of temporary 
assistance for needy families.”  Id. § 862a(b). 
117 Id. § 862a(d)(1)(A)–(B).  All but twelve states have limited the ban, some opting out 
completely, but seven states have extended the federal plan by banning or limiting assistance for those 
with only misdemeanor marijuana convictions.  BOIRE, supra note 111, at 9.  “Only felony drug 
offenses result in this ban [on assistance]; not robbery, not kidnapping, not even murder.”  Id. at 8–9. 
118 Public housing leases are required to include a provision that “any drug-related criminal 
activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s 
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000).  A conviction is not necessary for eviction to take place; 
eviction is possible even in instances where the tenant had no knowledge of the activity.  The Supreme 
Court has held that “[s]ection 1437d(l)(6) requires lease terms that give local public housing authorities 
the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engages in 
drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related 
activity.”  Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128, 136 (2002) (upholding eviction 
of tenants whose grandsons were caught smoking marijuana in parking lot of apartment complex). 
119 See BOIRE, supra note 111, at 4–5 (noting that in most cases sanctions are triggered 
automatically by conviction and “apply regardless of the specifics of the offense”). 
120 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006).  This loss of eligibility for student aid applies only to drug 
convictions; no other crime carries this penalty.  BOIRE, supra note 111, at 10.  According to Rep. 
Barney Frank, “[s]omeone who commits murder or armed robbery is not automatically barred from 
financial aid eligibility, . . . but if you have even one non-violent drug conviction you can’t get any aid 
for a year, with longer bans for people with additional convictions.”  Press Release, Rep. Barney Frank, 
Coalition Files Bill to Repeal Ban on Federal Financial Aid to Students with Drug Convictions (Feb. 
28, 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/frank/student_aid01.html. 
121 BOIRE, supra note 111, at 10. 
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college.122  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
every year an estimated 17,000 to 20,000 lose access to Pell Grants and 
29,000 to 41,000 lose access to student loans.123  This law may “primarily 
affect[] low-income students and exempt[] the wealthy, who don’t need aid 
to attend college,” and target young blacks, “who are disproportionately 
prosecuted for drug offenses and already less likely to complete 
college.”124  This law raises the possibility that mere youthful 
indiscretions125 could prevent low-income or minority individuals from 
ever reaping the benefits of a college education.126 
Marijuana prohibition has proven to be too costly, both financially and 
socially.  Despite the fact that billions of dollars are spent every year to 
prevent marijuana consumption, the best available data suggests that the 
expenditures are simply not buying much.  It is unlikely that increased 
funding or stronger penalties will solve the problem.  Federal and state 
efforts to reduce marijuana production and use through prohibition have 
been ineffective, and those efforts have been far less than equitably applied 
across economic and racial divisions.  Those members of our society most 
in need are denied access to vital public assistance programs, in many 
instances for an offense that in an increasing number of jurisdictions is a 
low level enforcement priority.127  Marijuana prohibition is causing too 
much harm—completely out of proportion to the purported harm it is 
                                                                                                                          
122 Id. 
123 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE 
IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF SELECTED BENEFITS, NO. GAO-05-238, at 
12 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05238.pdf [hereinafter GAO DRUG 
OFFENDERS].  These figures do not take into account “those individuals who may not have sought 
financial aid out of fear that their prior drug convictions would preclude them from receiving money.”  
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Renews Call for End to “Drug Question” for Financial Aid Applicants: 
Unwise Measure Blocks Qualified Students from Higher Education (Mar. 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/gen/10784prs20050310.html. 
These figures include those convicted for any illicit substance offense, but given the high 
percentage of drug convictions attributed to marijuana, coupled with the fact that this law applies even 
to misdemeanor convictions, it can be assumed that marijuana offenses account for a significant portion 
of those affected. 
124 Editorial, Marijuana and College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at A26, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File. 
125 See, e.g., id. (“The law applies even to offenses so minor that they are normally punished by 
probation, a small fine or community service.”); Seema Mehta, Groups Fight Rule on Aid to Students, 
L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (noting that one 
twenty-five-year-old student lost financial aid following a misdemeanor conviction for possession of a 
pipe containing marijuana residue, for which the only court-ordered sanction was a fine). 
126 The GAO states that the benefits of higher education go beyond an increase in earnings 
potential and include “becom[ing] better mothers, fathers, children, voters, and citizens.”  GAO DRUG 
OFFENDERS, supra note 123, at 59–60.  But see id. at 60 (“[T]hese studies do not comment on whether 
the loss of federal education assistance (as occurs for drug offenders through the provisions of the 
HEA) contributes to individuals’ not completing postsecondary education, or whether those individuals 
who are denied federal education assistance generate the necessary funding to attend institutions of 
higher education in other ways.”). 
127 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
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preventing.128  Since it is unlikely that any other prohibition strategy for 
curtailing consumption would be more effective than the current model, 
there is a strong case that the entire enterprise is futile, and a good 
argument for abandoning it. 
III.  STATE DECRIMINALIZATION IN THE SHADOW OF FEDERAL 
PROHIBITION 
Having evaluated the ineffectiveness, as well as the inequity and 
inefficiency, of the efforts to reduce supply and demand that are fueled by 
the federal policy of marijuana prohibition, it is necessary to examine the 
system of decriminalization that is evolving across the country at state and 
local levels.  It is difficult to assess the political and administrative 
feasibility of decriminalization.  Politically, the system in this country is 
constantly changing.  Every new election and legislative session brings 
changes to the laws pertaining to recreational and medical marijuana 
use.129  As states and municipalities adopt a more liberal attitude toward 
marijuana use while the federal government maintains a policy of 
prohibition,130 the system becomes increasingly difficult to administer.131 
Decriminalization of marijuana is a wholly unsatisfactory compromise 
between strict prohibition and legalization.132  Decriminalization carries 
with it many of the same societal costs associated with total prohibition133 
and retains almost every negative aspect associated with prohibition.134  
                                                                                                                          
128 The concentration on marijuana prohibition has been at the expense of enforcing the 
prohibition of more harmful substances.  See Ben Wallace-Wells, How America Lost the War on 
Drugs, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/17438347/how_ 
america_lost_the_war_on_drugs/8 (“By the summer of 2005, the drug czar’s failures were beginning to 
spill out into the open.  For four years, while he focused obsessively on pot, [ONDCP Director John] 
Walters had done virtually nothing about meth[amphetamines], which [were] rapidly devastating the 
red states that had elected his boss.”). 
129 See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 7, at app. L (listing twenty-seven states that 
considered a total of fifty-two bills during the 2007 and 2008 legislative sessions); Kessler, supra note 
7 (noting that in 2008 “Massachusetts voters decriminalized possession of small amounts of the drug, 
eliminating criminal penalties for people caught with an ounce or less of marijuana” and “Michigan 
joined 12 other states in allowing the use of marijuana by very ill patients to relieve pain, nausea, 
appetite loss and other symptoms”). 
130 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
131 See Michael Booth, “Possession Is OK, But As Soon As You Introduce the Idea of Individuals 
Growing . . .”: America’s Complex Pot Compromise, DENVER POST, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, DPOST File (“Take one swift glance at a U.S. map coded to reflect the widely 
varying marijuana laws in each state, and drug policy seems to range from irrational to incoherent.”).  
Differences between state and local marijuana provisions add to this difficulty.  See Richardson, supra 
note 4 (noting that the Denver measure making marijuana possession the “lowest law-enforcement 
priority” was “superseded by state and federal laws banning marijuana possession”). 
132 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 268 (positing that decriminalization can be seen as a 
compromise between maintaining prohibition and adopting full legalization). 
133 See supra text accompanying notes 111–14 (noting that collateral sanctions may attach to 
either arrest or conviction and to both misdemeanor and felony charges). 
134 The one positive aspect is that the budgetary costs associated with enforcement are 
undoubtedly less under decriminalization.  See, e.g., JEFFREY A. MIRON, THE EFFECT OF MARIJUANA 
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Decriminalization as it currently exists removes the criminal sanctions for 
possession of marijuana for personal use135 without providing for a non-
criminal method of obtaining it;136 therefore, all trafficking remains 
illegal.137  The enforcement and deterrence efforts aimed at trafficking 
remain the same as under strict prohibition,138 which means that the racial 
and economic disparities associated with these methods are also retained.  
                                                                                                                          
DECRIMINALIZATION ON THE BUDGETS OF MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNMENTS, WITH A DISCUSSION OF 
DECRIMINALIZATION’S EFFECT ON MARIJUANA USE 1 (2002), http://www.changetheclimate.org/ 
bu-study/mass_budget.pdf (estimating a savings of approximately $24.3 million in law enforcement 
resources for Massachusetts). 
135 Decriminalization may create a false sense of security by only theoretically removing the harsh 
sanctions for possession while in practice maintaining the status quo of prohibition.  See, e.g., LEVINE 
& SMALL, supra note 105, at 38–43 (describing methods New York City police use to trick those guilty 
of simple possession, which has been only a ticketable offense since 1977, into revealing marijuana, 
thereby making them guilty of having marijuana in public, a misdemeanor for which they are arrested, 
handcuffed, and taken to a police station); Richardson, supra note 4 (explaining that a second voter 
initiative mandating that Denver officials take specific action to make possession lowest enforcement 
priority was necessary after the first initiative resulted in an increase in marijuana arrests).  Despite 
Denver’s voters twice telling city officials that they wanted possession arrests to be the lowest 
enforcement priority, the city admits that both measures have been ignored and there has been no 
change in policy.  Posting of Mike Nizza to The Lede Blog, Denver Officials Ignore Marijuana Votes, 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/denver-officials-ignore-marijuana-votes/ (Mar. 6, 2008, 
9:13 EST). 
Possession arrests have increased annually, notwithstanding decriminalization and other efforts to 
reduce sanctions.  See NORML, Marijuana Arrests for Year 2007: 872,721 Tops Record High—Five 
Percent Increase Over 2006, http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=7698, Sept. 15, 2008 (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2009) (noting that possession accounts for eighty-nine percent of marijuana arrests and “there 
has been a dramatic 195 percent increase in marijuana arrests in the last 15 years”); supra note 4 
(noting that more than forty states have either decriminalized or reduced sanctions for possession). 
Arrest, even without conviction, can cause ongoing harm.  See, e.g., David Abel, Questions and 
Answers: Voters Back Marijuana Law Change, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File (noting that while opponents of the Massachusetts 
decriminalization provision argue that “most people arrested for marijuana possession have their 
records cleared within six months . . . the state’s Criminal History Systems Board said that marijuana 
possession arrests and convictions are records that remain visible to employers, even when the charges 
are dismissed”).  “The records of arrests alone are visible to schools, law enforcement agencies, nursing 
homes, camps, and most companies employing someone who works with children or the elderly can 
see arrest records.”  Id. 
136 This Part focuses on decriminalization as it currently exists in the United States.  Other forms 
of decriminalization could allow for non-criminal acquisition, such as limited cultivation for personal 
use or not-for-profit transfers of small amounts of marijuana between individuals.  See Act to Remove 
Federal Penalties for the Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible Adults, H.R. 5843, 110th Cong. 
(2008) (removing federal penalties for not-for-profit transfer between adults of an ounce or less); 
KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 279 (positing that cultivation for personal use would remove marijuana 
from the criminal justice system). 
137 See Booth, supra note 131 (“In a growing number of states and large cities, possessing and 
smoking a little pot is either a minor offense or no crime at all, while growing or distributing the drug 
still gets you in big trouble.”).  Anyone who sells marijuana is still considered a criminal, including 
those who sell to friends and family.  The most recent data from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services’ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration indicates that more than 
eighty percent of marijuana is bought from friends and family.  SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NSDUH REPORT: HOW AND 
WHERE YOUNG ADULTS OBTAIN MARIJUANA fig.2 (2006), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/ 
2k6/MJsource/MJsource.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). 
138 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 268 (noting that “decriminalization means leaving production 
and distribution of the drug entirely illegal”). 
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In addition, because decriminalization offers no new methods of deterring 
underage use, there is no positive impact on the underage usage rates 
attributable to decriminalization.139 
Although experience with decriminalization has shown it does not 
have an appreciable effect on overall usage rates,140 any increase in 
demand associated with an easing of possession sanctions is still supplied 
“entirely by the black market.”141  Removing the criminal sanctions for 
personal use does not “dismantle the destructive and dangerous criminal 
supply networks that have taken deep root” in our own backyard.142  Not 
only does decriminalization do nothing to remove the criminal networks, it 
may increase their profits.143  “Thus, decriminalization is likely to prove to 
be the worst of all possible policies when it comes to the drug-dealing 
aspect of the marijuana problem.”144 
Thirteen states have now adopted some form of decriminalization,145 
but without decriminalization of marijuana at the federal level, this simply 
creates a system that puts state and local drug measures easing the 
restrictions on marijuana at odds with federal laws prohibiting all 
marijuana use.146  Decriminalization at the federal level that mirrors 
decriminalization at the state level would only eliminate the conflict 
currently existing between federal law and state and local measures.147  
Federal decriminalization would produce no additional positive impact on 
the usage rates among young people, would do nothing to dismantle illegal 
trafficking operations, and would maintain many of the racial and 
                                                                                                                          
139 See Joffe et al., supra note 79, at e634–36 (theorizing that decriminalization could lead to 
increased underage use). 
140 See INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 104 (finding “there is little evidence that 
decriminalization of marijuana use necessarily leads to a substantial increase in marijuana use”). 
141 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 269. 
142 Robb, supra note 31; see supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text (discussing supply 
networks in the United States). 
143 Pacula et al., supra note 4, at 4. 
144 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 269. 
145 These states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon.  See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
146 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28–29 (2005) (noting that under the Supremacy Clause federal 
law trumps state laws permitting possession for personal use). 
147 A federal measure decriminalizing possession would not eliminate all conflict between state 
and federal law because it “would end federal prosecution of such crimes, but it would not supersede 
state laws.”  Abel, supra note 4.  This is particularly notable given that the currently proposed federal 
measure would decriminalize possession of 3.5 ounces or less, whereas many state decriminalization 
measures only allow possession of one ounce or less.  See id. (reporting that Massachusetts became the 
thirteenth state to decriminalize possession of “less than an ounce of marijuana”). 
Conflicts can also exist between state and local law when municipalities adopt measures that are 
less severe than state sanctions.  See Booth, supra note 131 (“Denver’s possession penalties were wiped 
off the books, but city police say they must—and want to—enforce the state law . . . .”); Nizza, supra 
note 135 (noting that the continued increase in possession arrests in Denver despite passage of two 
voter initiatives reflects charges made for state-level violations and not violations of city ordinance). 
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economic disparities associated with prohibition.148 
For those opposed to strict prohibition, decriminalization of personal 
use may be viewed as a positive step.149  However, because in many ways 
decriminalization is no better policy than prohibition, decriminalization as 
it currently exists, whether at the state or federal level, is unsuitable as a 
long-term solution. 
IV.  LEGALIZATION & REGULATION 
There is certainly no consensus among American voters that 
recreational use of marijuana should be legalized,150 but given the growing 
reluctance to impose criminal sanctions for personal recreational use, 
coupled with the support for legalized medical marijuana,151 marijuana 
legalization merits serious consideration.152 
Legalizing marijuana would eliminate the “destructive and dangerous 
criminal supply networks” of the marijuana black market.153  It would also 
remove the direct and collateral sanctions that currently fall so harshly 
upon minority and low-income marijuana users.  Putting an end to 
government prohibition of marijuana would eliminate the need for both the 
                                                                                                                          
148 A federal decriminalization bill has been introduced, but it is unlikely to be passed anytime 
soon.  See Abel, supra note 4 (reporting that sponsor of measure, Rep. Barney Frank, believes “it will 
take a lot more time before enough of his fellow lawmakers want to take a stand on the issue”). 
149 But see id. (noting that decriminalization may make it harder to get advocates behind push for 
legalization). 
150 See Joseph Carroll, Who Supports Marijuana Legalization?, GALLUP, Nov. 1, 2005, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/19561/Who-Supports-Marijuana-Legalization.aspx (reporting Gallup poll 
results showing support for marijuana legalization increasing from twelve percent in 1969 to thirty-six 
percent in 2005). 
151 Supra text accompanying note 7. 
152 It may be only a matter of time before some state or local electorate votes not to decriminalize 
possession but to mandate taxation and regulation of the sale of marijuana to adults.  Several 
legalization initiatives have been on state ballots in past elections.  In 2007, a legalization initiative on 
the ballot in a town in Idaho received forty-six percent of the vote.  StopTheDrugWar.org, Marijuana: 
Three of Four Reform Initiatives Pass in Hailey, Idaho, DRUG WAR CHRON., Nov. 9, 2007, 
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/509/marijuana_initiatives_pass_hailey_idaho (reporting that 
regulation and taxation mandate was the only marijuana reform initiative that failed to pass, losing 
674–573). 
See Dean E. Murphy, Defying Bush Administration, Voters in California Back $3 Billion for Stem 
Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P10 (noting that fifty-seven percent of Alaskan voters 
rejected legalizing marijuana use for those over twenty-one); StopTheDrugWar.org, Election 2006: 
Initiatives Defeated in Colorado and Nevada, But Hundreds of Thousands Voted to Legalize 
Marijuana, DRUG WAR CHRON., Nov. 10, 2006, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/461/marijuana_ 
legalization_initiatives_defeated_colorado_nevada (noting legalization initiatives were defeated in 
Colorado and Nevada in 2006, with Nevada initiative receiving forty-four percent of vote, an increase 
of five percent over 2002 election results). 
“Stop the Drug War is an international organization working for an end to drug prohibition 
worldwide and for interim policy reform in the United States drug laws and criminal justice system.”  
StopTheDrugWar.org, http://stopthedrugwar.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
153 Robb, supra note 31; KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 270. 
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billions of dollars and the countless man-hours154 spent annually on what 
has proven to be a futile effort to appreciably reduce the availability of 
marijuana.155  This Part considers a policy of legalization that would 
replace government prohibition with government regulation and 
taxation.156  Two possible means of regulation are discussed briefly, but the 
primary focus is on the fundamental differences between legalization of 
marijuana and both prohibition and decriminalization. 
Marijuana is by far the most widely used illicit drug in the United 
States.157  While those opposed to legalization point to the potential 
physical harms associated with smoking marijuana,158 one of the strongest 
arguments in support of legalization is that “arrest and criminal justice 
processing is for many users the most substantial risk of using 
                                                                                                                          
154 A report by NORML estimates that “[e]very time a marijuana arrest occurs—even the most 
trivial arrest—at least two police officers are taken off the street for several hours to prepare the 
paperwork and process the defendant.”  NORML, NORML REPORT ON SIXTY YEARS OF MARIJUANA 
PROHIBITION IN THE U.S. 9 (2003), available at http://norml.org/pdf_files/NORML_Report_Sixty_ 
Years_US_Prohibition.pdf.  Even assuming “that all the approximately 600,000 marijuana arrests 
reported in 1995 were simple cases involving no prior use of police time or resources and taking no 
more than two hours [and two police officers] to process, then marijuana prohibition costs law 
enforcement a minimum of 2,400,000 man hours annually.”  Id. 
155 NORML posits that “there is no evidence that government is interested in calculating the 
precise cost of marijuana prohibition because it does not want to have to justify these costs to the 
American public” and argues that “[i]t is wasteful and disadvantageous to spend billions of otherwise 
limited federal dollars on a failed and ineffective public policy at the expense of already underfunded 
social programs.”  Id. 
156 Replacing prohibition with a system of regulation and taxation would potentially bring in 
billions in tax revenue.  See Dan Mitchell, Legitimizing Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, at C5, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting that California’s medical marijuana industry is 
“a full-fledged industry . . . taking in about $2 billion a year and generating $100 million in state sales 
taxes”). 
157 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that forty percent of the 
population has used marijuana in their lifetime, ten percent have used it in the past year, and six percent 
in the past month.  SAMHSA DRUG USE TABLES, supra note 102, at tbl.1.12B.  By comparison, the 
percentages of use in the past month for cocaine, including crack cocaine, and for hallucinogens, such 
as LSD and ecstasy, are one percent and four-tenths of a percent of the population, respectively.  Id. at 
tbl.1.1B.  The percentages for heroin and other illicit drugs are less than those for hallucinogens.  Id. 
The marijuana figures are usage rates for the population aged twelve and older.  For many adult 
age groups, the lifetime usage rates are over fifty percent, and the past year and month rates are more 
than twice the total population usage rates.  Id. at tbl.1.12B. 
158 The government warns that the “detrimental health effects” of marijuana can include impaired 
memory, panic attacks, and a potential to promote lung cancer.  MARIJUANA HEALTH EFFECTS, supra 
note 79; INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 119 (noting that “cellular, genetic, and human studies all 
suggest that marijuana smoke is an important risk factor for the development of respiratory cancer” but 
that “[m]ore definitive evidence that habitual marijuana smoking leads or does not lead to respiratory 
cancer” requires further study).  But see id. at 119, 127 (reporting that “[t]here is no conclusive 
evidence that marijuana causes cancer in humans, including cancers usually related to tobacco use” and 
finding a “distinctive” but “mild and short lived” “marijuana withdrawal syndrome”); Kirchheimer, 
supra note 18 (citing results of fifteen different studies, conducted over periods of three months to 
thirteen years, involving 700 regular marijuana users and 484 non-users, that “found only a ‘very small’ 
impairment in memory and learning among long-term marijuana users,” and otherwise finding “scores 
on thinking tests . . . similar to those who don’t smoke marijuana”). 
 2009] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA POLICY 1731 
marijuana.”159  The success of the initiatives decriminalizing possession for 
personal use reflects a growing reluctance to make criminals out of 
everyone who uses marijuana;160 however, the reality is that, 
notwithstanding those initiatives, every thirty-seven seconds someone is 
arrested for a marijuana offense.161  From this perspective, legalization is 
the best means for removing the most harmful element of marijuana use. 
Legalization of marijuana would represent a radical change in policy, 
but consideration of such a change is warranted because of the dismal 
showing of the prohibition policy in meeting its goals.  Billions of dollars, 
millions of arrests, and nearly forty years of prohibition have not made 
marijuana go away.162  Instead, “the drug has grown in popularity at a rate 
outpacing all others while simultaneously enriching those willing to break 
the law.”163  Legalization takes an entirely different approach.  Legalization 
represents the “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” attitude.  Having failed to 
effectively exert control over marijuana availability and marijuana use 
from the outside through prohibition, legalization exerts control from the 
inside—replacing government prohibition of marijuana with government 
regulation. 
A.  Effects of Marijuana Legalization 
The regulatory systems of alcohol and tobacco are frequently 
suggested as models for regulating marijuana.164  Presumably as with 
alcohol and tobacco, marijuana would be sold to the general adult 
                                                                                                                          
159 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 268; see supra text accompanying notes 115–20 (detailing direct 
and collateral sanctions attached to marijuana offenses); cf. Joffe et al., supra note 79, at e636 (noting 
that alcohol and tobacco cause far more health-related harms to society than marijuana); Kirchheimer, 
supra note 18 (reporting research results that indicate impairments from marijuana use “were less than 
what is typically found from using alcohol or other drugs”). 
Legalization could also reduce potential physical harm.  See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, 270–71 
(positing that “legalization of marijuana use might also lead to a lower rate of damage per use incident 
as a result of changes in the norms and customs surrounding marijuana smoking: away from profound 
intoxication . . . and toward use at carefully controlled times and places”). 
160 See Robb, supra note 31 (“Decriminalization for recreational drug use has been a safe haven 
for those who believe that locking up people strictly for drug use is wrong . . . .”). 
161 See FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2007: PERSONS ARRESTED, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/arrests/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (approximately 1.8 
million arrests for drug abuse violations, 47.4% of which were for marijuana offenses).  In November 
2008, “law enforcement officials [made] their 20 millionth marijuana arrest.”  Paul Armentano, 20 
Million Arrests, and Counting, IN THESE TIMES, Oct. 2008, at 16, 16, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, ITT File. 
162 See Gettman, supra note 75, at 18 (positing that the increase in marijuana production and “its 
proliferation to every part of the country demonstrate that marijuana has become a pervasive and 
ineradicable part of our national economy”).  
163 U.N. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 22, at 155. 
164 See, e.g., Robin Room, In Thinking About Cannabis Policy, What Can Be Learned from 
Alcohol and Tobacco?, in 1 European Monitoring Ctr. for Drugs & Drug Addiction, A Cannabis 
Reader: Global Issues and Local Experiences 119 (Sharon Rödner Sznitman et al. eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/monographs/cannabis (follow Volume 1 pdf 
hyperlink); Gettman, supra note 75, at 18. 
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population, with restrictions prohibiting underage use the only real 
limitations in place.  A more restrictive “personal license” system is 
suggested by Professor Mark Kleiman, which would also impose age limit 
restrictions, but in addition would impose annual per user quantity limits 
on purchases.165  These are just two examples of possible regulatory 
systems.  Legalization of marijuana could take many forms, with varying 
degrees of regulatory control.  This section focuses on legalization of 
marijuana as an overall policy and how it differs from prohibition, not on 
the regulatory parameters of any particular legalization system.  This 
section examines from a legalization standpoint issues already addressed 
with respect to prohibition. 
The obvious distinctions between legalization and prohibition are 
budgetary ones.  Production, distribution, and possession of marijuana are 
all illegal under the Controlled Substances Act.166  Whereas 
decriminalization only eases the sanctions against possession, legalization 
would remove the criminal sanctions from all elements of the marijuana 
industry.  Regardless of the level of regulation necessary for a legalization 
policy, removal of all sanctions represents an immediate savings of the 
billions of budgetary dollars and millions of man-hours expended every 
year enforcing prohibition.167  In addition to eliminating the budgetary 
expenditures of prohibition, legalizing the production and distribution of 
marijuana would bring in tax revenues.  Marijuana production and 
distribution already constitute a significant market,168 with the United 
States marijuana market estimated to have a value of over $10 billion.169  
                                                                                                                          
165 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 277–79.  Mark Kleiman is “Professor of Public Policy in the 
UCLA School of Public Affairs.  He teaches courses on methods of policy analysis and on drug abuse 
and crime control policy.”  UCLA.edu, http://www.spa.ucla.edu/dept.cfm?d=ps&s=faculty&f 
=faculty1.cfm&id=137 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
166 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006). 
167 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 271 (positing that post-legalization enforcement of taxation 
and regulation “would be a small fraction” of the current spending on prohibition). 
168 One report by a marijuana public policy analyst claims that “American marijuana farmers grew 
22.3 million pounds of marijuana in 2006 with a value of $35.8 billion,” making marijuana “by far the 
largest cash crop in the United States when compared to the average production values of other crops 
from 2003 to 2005.”  Gettman, supra note 75, at 11 & tbls.3–5, 13 & tbl.7; see Eric Bailey, Pot Is 
Called Biggest Cash Crop, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at B3, available at LEXIS, LAT File (citing the 
report and noting that, while the government withheld judgment on the findings of the report, an 
ONDCP spokesman cited examples of other countries combating their “largest cash crops” of illicit 
drugs as an argument against legalization of marijuana).  This report also claims that “marijuana is the 
top cash crop in 12 states, one of the top 3 cash crops in 30 states, and one of the top 5 cash crops in 39 
states.”  Gettman, supra note 75, at 13.  These figures, which include amounts eradicated by drug 
enforcement agencies, are extrapolated using DEA eradication estimates.  Id. at 11.  This report 
estimates that the government eradicates less than ten percent of marijuana cultivated in the United 
States, whereas the DEA estimates that between thirty and fifty percent is eradicated.  Id. at 7; DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, CANNABIS CULTIVATION, supra note 70, at 13.  This discrepancy is understandable given 
that the United Nations reports that in the United States “official estimates of the extent of domestic 
cultivation vary by more than a factor of six.”  U.N. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 22, at 155. 
169 See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHAT 
AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS 26 tbl.9 (2001), available at http://www.whitehousedrug 
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Under prohibition, none of this market is taxed.  Legalized marijuana 
would generate billions of dollars in tax revenue.170  As a previously 
prohibited, and thereby untaxed, commodity, “the yield of a new tax on 
[marijuana] is pure gain.”171  The budgetary impact, while only one of 
many factors to be considered in evaluating a marijuana policy, strongly 
favors legalization. 
Another factor to be considered is medical marijuana, which has 
gained wide support.172  As noted above, thirty-one states and the District 
of Columbia have recognized its value.173  Yet in Gonzales v. Raich, the 
Supreme Court held that “the mere fact that marijuana . . . is used for 
medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to distinguish it from the core 
activities regulated by the CSA.”174  Regardless of state efforts to support 
medical marijuana, in “any conflict between federal and state law, federal 
law shall prevail.”175  And state medical marijuana initiatives do not 
represent the only source of conflict between medical marijuana and 
federal prohibition.176  For example, the Institute of Medicine recommends 
further research to investigate the therapeutic benefits of medical 
marijuana,177 but federal prohibition acts to inhibit medical marijuana 
                                                                                                                          
policy.gov/publications/pdf/american_users_spend_2002.pdf (estimating total expenditures in 2000 at 
$10.5 billion).  But see Eric Bailey, A Call to Tax Marijuana, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at B1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (estimating marijuana industry in California alone at $14 
billion dollars). 
170 Facing a state budget crisis, in February 2009 a California assemblyman introduced the 
Marijuana Control, Regulation, and Education Act, a measure that “would remove marijuana and its 
derivatives from existing statutes defining and regulating controlled substances” and “would instead 
legalize the possession, sale, cultivation, and other conduct relating to marijuana . . . by persons 21 
years of age and older” by establishing “a set of regulations and laws concerning marijuana comparable 
to those imposed on alcohol.”  A.B. 390, 2009–10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Bailey, supra note 169.  
With an estimated $14 billion marijuana industry, this measure “could mean upward of $1 billion in tax 
revenue for [California] each year.”  Id. 
171 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 272 (noting that “revenues from marijuana taxes would . . . be 
virtually found money”). 
172 See Booth, supra note 131 (reporting that “national polls show up to 73 percent support for 
medical marijuana”). 
173 Supra text accompanying note 7. 
174 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005). 
175 Id. at 29.  Medical marijuana statutes can also run afoul of state laws prohibiting the sale of 
marijuana.  See Bill Nemitz, Maine’s Cannabis Contradiction, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Maine), 
Feb. 26, 2009, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, PORTPS File (noting that Maine’s medical 
marijuana statute, passed a decade ago, provided for no legal means of obtaining marijuana, a “Catch-
22” which an upcoming ballot initiative may remedy). 
176 See Denial of Marijuana Scheduling Petition, Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 
53,767, 53,773 (Dep’t of Justice Dec. 29, 1989) (denial of petition) (denying petition to change 
scheduling of marijuana despite DEA A.L.J. Francis L. Young’s recommendation that marijuana be 
rescheduled as a Schedule II drug with accepted use in medical treatment); U.S. Resists Easing Curb on 
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1989, § 1, at 20, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File 
(reporting that the DEA rejected the recommendation of its chief administrative judge and refused to 
relax restrictions on medical marijuana). 
177 INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 3–4. 
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research.178  Given that these conflicts would not exist under a policy of 
legalization, the medical marijuana issue is a factor that heavily favors 
legalization.  
Full legalization of marijuana has yet to be adopted by any country or 
state; therefore, it is difficult to foresee what effect legalization might have 
on the number of marijuana users.  Decriminalization has not been shown 
to produce an increase in use,179 but legalization and decriminalization are 
                                                                                                                          
178 For example, the DEA maintains a monopoly on marijuana production for approved research.  
See Marc Kaufman, Researchers Press DEA to Let Them Grow Marijuana, WASH. POST, May 24, 
2007, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST (“The [DEA] has opposed petitions that 
would end the government’s marijuana monopoly, saying that the current system works well and that 
allowing other growers could lead to more diversion to illicit use.  All the marijuana produced for 
research is grown at the University of Mississippi and distributed through the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse.”).  Marijuana is the only Schedule I drug where such a monopoly is maintained, Drug 
Enforcement Administration’s Regulation of Medicine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 72 (2007) 
[hereinafter DEA Hearing] (questioning of David Murray, Director of Counter-Drug Technology, 
ONDCP, by Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security), 
and the DEA has refused to act on recommendations of its own administrative law judges and relax the 
monopoly to facilitate legitimate medical marijuana research.  Kaufman, supra (noting that a DEA 
administrative law judge ruled to “break the government’s monopoly on growing [marijuana]” and 
allow the applicant to grow marijuana at his facility for research purposes). 
Professor Lyle E. Craker first filed an application with the DEA to grow marijuana in 2001.  
Manufacturer of Controlled Substances, 68 Fed. Reg. 43,755 (Dep’t of Justice July 24, 2003) (notice of 
application).  After a six-year wait, in 2007 Professor Craker finally received a recommendation for 
approval of his application from a DEA administrative law judge.  DEA A.L.J. Mary Ellen Bittner 
stated that “there is currently an inadequate supply of marijuana available for research purposes” and 
said that approving Professor Craker’s application would be “in the public interest.”  In the Matter of 
Lyle E. Craker, Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Dep’t of Justice Docket No. 05-16, Feb. 12, 2007, 
at 87.  The government filed an exception to the recommendation.  In the Matter of Lyle E. Craker, 
Government’s Exception to Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Dep’t of Justice Docket No. 05-16, 
Mar. 26, 2007, at 2.  After that filing, a letter signed by forty-five members of Congress was sent to 
DEA Administrator Karen Tandy urging that Professor Craker be allowed to produce marijuana for 
legitimate research purposes.  Letter from Members of Congress to Karen P. Tandy, Adm’r, DEA, 
available at http://www.maps.org/mmj/signonfinal.pdf.  Despite this congressional support, the DEA 
issued its final ruling in January 2009 denying Professor Craker’s petition to grow marijuana for 
medical research.  Lyle E. Craker, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,101 (Dep’t of Justice Jan. 14, 2009) (denial of 
application). 
Prohibition can also act indirectly to limit medical marijuana research.  Researchers at Ohio State 
University have discovered a possible link between one of the active ingredients in marijuana and the 
possible prevention or reversal of Alzheimer’s disease.  Maia Szalavitz, Marijuana’s Memory Paradox, 
BRAIN & BODY, http://health.msn.com/health-topics/alzheimers-disease/articlepage.aspx?cp-document 
id=100230518 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  “Given the controversy that would likely arise if a 
protective effect were to be discovered, however, no one has funded the epidemiological studies that 
would be needed to show this.”  Id. (noting difficulty one researcher had in getting an earlier paper on 
the subject published); see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Dismisses Medical Benefit from Marijuana, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting claims by 
scientists “that the federal government had actively discouraged research”). 
179 See Eric Single et al., The Impact of Cannabis Decriminalisation in Australia and the United 
States, 21 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 157, 177 (2000) (“The key aspect of cannabis decriminalisation is that 
it does not appear to lead to increases in availability, use, or problems associated with cannabis use.”).  
During the 1970s, eleven states had some type of decriminalization, and there was no measurable 
increase in use in those states compared to other states.  KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 268–69. 
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wholly different policies.180  If “arrest and criminal justice processing is for 
many users the most substantial risk of using marijuana,”181 then removal 
of those sanctions makes it likely that legalization will bring about an 
increase in use.182  Decriminalization of marijuana in the Netherlands 
brought little to no increase, but the later “de facto legalization” of 
marijuana when it was sold in Dutch “coffee shops” may have led to an 
increase in use.183  The repeal of alcohol prohibition in the United States 
did not bring about an immediate, large increase in consumption of 
alcohol, but a sharp rise in consumption did occur fifteen years later when 
the strict controls put in place after Prohibition began to be relaxed and 
advertising of alcohol became more aggressive.184  A strong possibility that 
legalizing marijuana will result in some increase in use is a factor that 
weighs against legalization.185  It can, however, be argued that this negative 
effect of legalization would be outweighed by removal of the many harsh 
consequences of prohibition.186 
                                                                                                                          
180 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 270 (“[F]ull legalization . . . would have effects so different 
from those of mere decriminalization that the two policies should not be discussed . . . as more and less 
. . . versions of essentially the same policy.”); Single et al., supra note 179, at 178 (“The success of 
decriminalisation [in not producing an increase in use] should not be taken to indicate that . . . 
legalisation would also have little or no impact.”). 
181 KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 268. 
182 Compare Egan & Miron, supra note 48, at 26 (positing that “any increase in demand from 
legalization would plausibly come from casual users, whose marijuana use would likely be modest”), 
with KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 274 (arguing that there is no question as to whether an increase would 
occur “but how large it would be and how much of it would reflect new heavy use”).  Both sources 
point out that marijuana and alcohol may be substitute goods and some increase in marijuana use might 
be attributed to a decrease in alcohol consumption.  Id. at 275; Egan & Miron, supra note 48, at 26–27. 
183 INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 103–04; Robert MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Interpreting 
Dutch Cannabis Policy: Reasoning by Analogy in the Legalization Debate, 278 SCIENCE 47, 48–50 
(1997) (concluding that “progression from depenalization to de facto legalization” led to an increase in 
marijuana use).  But see Dirk Korf, An Open Front Door: The Coffee Shop Phenomenon in the 
Netherlands, in 1 European Monitoring Ctr. for Drugs & Drug Addiction, A Cannabis Reader: Global 
Issues and Local Experiences 137, 149 (Sharon Rödner Sznitman et al. eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/monographs/cannabis (follow Volume 1 pdf hyperlink) 
(questioning MacCoun and Reuter’s conclusions, supra, finding “striking similarities” between 
cannabis use in the Netherlands and other European Union countries, as well as the United States, and 
positing that “[i]t seems more likely that the parallel development of cannabis use with stages in the 
decriminalisation process in the Netherlands was accidental, and that trends in cannabis use were 
predominantly affected by other factors that were not unique to the Netherlands”). 
184 MacCoun & Reuter, supra note 183, at 51; see also Mark A.R. Kleiman, Dopey, Boozy, 
Smoky—and Stupid, AM. INT., Jan.–Feb. 2007, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm 
?Id=224&MId=7 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (“Full commercial legalization of cannabis, on the model 
now applied to alcohol, would vastly increase the cannabis-abuse problem by giving the marketing 
geniuses who have done such a fine job persuading children to smoke tobacco, drink to excess and 
supersize themselves with junk food another vice to foster.”). 
185 See Gettman, supra note 75, at 17 (“Advocates for and supporters of the current prohibitive 
marijuana policies often argue against alternatives to law enforcement suppression policies by claiming 
that legalization . . . would lead to greater use of marijuana.”). 
186 The harsh consequences of prohibition include the death penalty.  Although the Supreme Court 
has held that only those convicted “for crimes that take the life of the victim” can be put to death, 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008) (reversing state supreme court judgment upholding 
death sentence for convicted child rapist), it should be noted that federal law as it is currently written 
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A possible increase in adult use of marijuana under legalization does 
not necessarily translate into an increase in underage use.  Advocates of 
legalization argue that legalizing marijuana may succeed where prohibition 
has failed and actually reduce the availability of marijuana for underage 
use.187  Underage use of marijuana is a necessary concern under any policy, 
and while it can be argued that marijuana is not so harmful as to require 
strict prohibition under all circumstances, every effort must be made to 
prevent and deter underage use.188  If retail sale of marijuana to adults is 
legalized, only selling to minors will remain illegal.189  Under the current 
system of prohibition, selling marijuana to anyone is illegal, regardless of 
age.  With no incentive to differentiate between the ages of their 
customers, drug dealers do not discriminate by age.190  On the other hand, 
stricter enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to 
those under eighteen is believed to have contributed to the significant 
decrease in cigarette smoking among teenagers.191  A marijuana 
legalization policy would also include an age limit on purchase and use, 
and provide for strong sanctions against those who ignore the restrictions.  
In forty years, prohibition has failed to reduce the availability of marijuana 
to teenagers.  There is no way of knowing exactly what effect legalization 
of marijuana might have on underage use.  Nevertheless, it may be possible 
to create and maintain a system at least as effective at deterring underage 
                                                                                                                          
includes marijuana trafficking among those offenses subject to the death penalty.  Distributing 100 
kilograms (approximately 220 pounds) of marijuana or 100 marijuana plants is subject to a sentence of 
imprisonment for not less than five years and not more than forty years.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) 
(2006).  Distributing 300 times those amounts (30,000 kilograms or 30,000 plants) while obtaining 
“substantial income or resources” from a “continuing criminal enterprise” with gross receipts of $10 
million or more in a twelve month period in “concert with five or more other persons” while occupying 
“a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management” is punishable by 
life in prison.  21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006).  Those who traffic in twice those amounts, either 60,000 
kilograms or 60,000 plants, or twice the gross receipts ($20 million), ceteris paribus, “shall be 
sentenced to death.”  18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1) (2006). 
187 See, e.g., Gettman, supra note 75, at 17 (“[W]ithout effective and credible control over 
production it is impossible to limit access to marijuana by teens and children, and limiting such access 
is not only the paramount objective of anti-drug policies but also the only certain way to reduce 
marijuana use in the long term.”); Kampia, supra note 33 (arguing that “the complete prohibition of 
marijuana for adults not only doesn’t help to keep marijuana away from kids, but it actually hampers 
such efforts”). 
188 See U.N. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 22, at 155–56 (noting that while “[i]t is nearly 
impossible to die of an overdose” of marijuana, the health risks associated with marijuana use “appear 
to be higher for people who start consuming [marijuana] during adolescence”). 
189See Kampia, supra note 33 (“Regulation works. . . . If we really want to control marijuana and 
keep it away from our kids, it’s time to bring it within the law and regulate it as we do tobacco.”). 
190 See id. (“Have you ever seen a marijuana dealer with a ‘We Card’ sign?”).  But see 
JustThinkTwice.com, Totally Lame (& Dangerous & Illegal) Things to Do on Pot, STUMBLE WEED, 
http://www.justthinktwice.com/stumbleweed/totally_lame_01.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) 
(“[D]ealing marijuana near schools or to minors brings extra punishment.”). 
191 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; Editorial, A Good Example for Fighting Tobacco, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at A22, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting remarkable 
success in New York City of reducing underage cigarette smoking through such efforts as aggressive 
anti-tobacco media campaign and cracking down on vendors who sell to minors). 
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use as the system we have now by focusing enforcement resources on only 
one demographic.192  For these reasons, underage use is not a factor that 
weighs heavily for or against legalization.193 
An issue that has not yet been addressed here is the concern over the 
increasing potency of marijuana.194  Improved cultivation methods, 
including the area of hydroponics, are producing higher potency strains of 
domestically produced marijuana.195  This increase in potency reflects one 
method used by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to circumvent 
prohibition enforcement.196  One concern with increased potency is that a 
marijuana user would be unprepared for the stronger effect of a higher 
potency product.197  Legalization would remove this concern.  Black 
market products are subject to little quality control and, in the case of a 
product like marijuana, no labeling.  This can also increase the possibility 
of receiving a product other than the intended purchase.  The National 
Institute on Drug Abuse reports that “marijuana is frequently combined 
with other drugs, such as crack cocaine, PCP, formaldehyde, and codeine 
cough syrup, sometimes without the user being aware of it.”198  Under 
legalization, a system of testing as to potency, and labeling as to both 
variety and potency would be required.  Just as alcoholic beverages are 
purchased based on brand, variety, and alcohol content, legalized 
marijuana would be selected by brand, variety, and potency.  Prohibition of 
marijuana has inadvertently helped to create the potency problem; 
legalization of marijuana would alleviate it. 
Full legalization of marijuana is an unknown.  Many countries, as well 
                                                                                                                          
192 See Gettman, supra note 75, at 17–18 (“Replacing the façade of control provided by current 
policies with effective regulatory policies is . . . the first step in enacting effective policies to reduce 
teenage marijuana use.”). 
193 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 275 (“Were it not for the fact that the current prohibition also 
signally fails to deny access to marijuana to minors . . . increased access by minors might count as an 
insuperable disadvantage of legalization.”). 
194 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 68, at 18 (reporting that “average 
THC (delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol) content in tested samples of marijuana” have almost doubled in 
the last ten years, from 5.01% in 1997 to 9.64% in 2007); U.N. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 156 (expressing concern that higher potency marijuana may increase health risks). 
195 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CANNABIS CULTIVATION, supra note 70, at 2, 9.  The DEA maintains that 
by the early 1990s, “[d]ue to modern sophisticated cultivation techniques, U.S.-grown marijuana 
became one of the most potent and highly-prized cannabis products in the world.”  DEA HISTORY, 
supra note 43, at 80. 
196 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CANNABIS CULTIVATION, supra note 70, at 2 (“Rising law enforcement 
pressure . . . has not yet stemmed the increase in domestic cannabis cultivation, either outdoors or 
indoors.  Rather, DTOs are simply adapting their methods (relocating to new areas, changing their 
growing cycles, and growing higher potency plants both indoors and outdoors) in order to continue 
operating in the United States while maintaining their profits.”). 
197 See Ted Leggett, Why Should We Care About Cannabis?, UNODC PERSPECTIVES, 
http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/en/perspectives/0601/page011.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) 
(“While more research is required to determine the impact of the ‘new,’ more potent cannabis, there 
has been an increase in the number of people complaining of ‘unexpected effects’ from consuming 
cannabis in emergency rooms in the United States.”). 
198 NIDA RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 17, at 2. 
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as a quarter of the states in the United States, have removed some or all of 
the criminal sanctions for personal use, but none have fully legalized 
production, distribution, and possession.199  This Note has addressed 
several issues relating to marijuana policy, but many factors will need to be 
considered in assessing the goals of a legalization policy, and the optimal 
regulatory system for achieving them.200  What is known and needs no 
further consideration is that the current policy of prohibition must be 
replaced.  Deterring the use of marijuana is a worthy goal, but the methods 
used in enforcing prohibition have been both harmful and ineffective.  It is 
time to admit that prohibition has failed to meet its goals and adopt a new 
marijuana policy.  Legalization could be that policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
What the United States would be like with legal 
recreational [marijuana] is unknown.  Sometimes, however, 
the known is so bad or futile that a trade for the unknown is 
the best course of action.201 
Prohibition of marijuana has proven to be a very expensive failure.  
Prohibition has, at best, had limited success in deterring the use of 
marijuana, and it has been ineffective in removing the criminal enterprises 
that work to meet the demand created by that use.  Programs designed to 
help keep kids from using marijuana are having little, if any, effect, and 
enforcement methods are doing nothing to reduce availability.  It is not 
difficult to imagine that the money and manpower devoted to these 
endeavors could be better utilized. 
The ineffectiveness of the enforcement and prevention methods of the 
federal prohibition policy, especially coupled with the racial and economic 
disparities in the way those methods are applied, undoubtedly helps 
explain the move away from a strict prohibition policy.  Now that 
decriminalization is slowly working its way from state to state and 
                                                                                                                          
199 See Danilo Ballotta et al., Cannabis Control in Europe, in 1 European Monitoring Ctr. for 
Drugs & Drug Addiction, A Cannabis Reader: Global Issues and Local Experiences 97, 112 (Sharon 
Rödner Sznitman et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications 
/monographs/cannabis (follow Volume 1 pdf hyperlink) (noting that “personal use of cannabis attracts 
administrative sanctions or alternatives to custodial sanctions in 16 countries” and that “drug policies in 
many European countries seem to concur that criminal action against non-problematic use/possession 
of cannabis should receive the lowest prosecutorial priority”) (footnote omitted); supra note 4 (listing 
states that have passed laws decriminalizing marijuana). 
200 This Note focuses on the economic implications of a change in marijuana policy.  There are 
many other factors to consider that are beyond the scope of this Note.  Among these are the 
international repercussions of legalizing marijuana.  The United States is a signatory to the United 
Nation’s Single Convention, which prohibits the illicit traffic in marijuana.  Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, art. 28, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.  Whether and to what extent 
this treaty should influence U.S. marijuana policy is just one of the factors to be addressed before any 
decision is reached concerning a change in policy. 
201 Robb, supra note 31. 
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municipality to municipality, it may not be possible to go back to a stricter 
policy.  If this is true, then the federal policy of prohibition must be 
abandoned and a new national policy adopted. 
The current system of decriminalization retains many of the same 
problems associated with the stricter policy of prohibition from which it is 
evolving.  The ineffectiveness and inequities of enforcing the prohibition 
on trafficking still remain.  Underage usage rates show no decrease through 
decriminalization, and may actually increase.  Decriminalization may 
remove the criminal sanctions from possession for personal use, but the 
continually increasing expenditures at state and federal levels indicate that 
no significant reduction in costs can be attributed to decriminalization.  
Fewer people might be going to jail,202 but otherwise the current system is 
identical to prohibition.  Without some significant change in form, 
decriminalization is no better policy than prohibition.203 
Legalization, on the other hand, is a complete unknown, and the 
evolving decriminalization system is no indicator of what legalization 
would be like.204  Under legalization, some increase in demand for 
marijuana is probably inevitable, but legalization would remove the supply 
side of the equation from the hands of criminals.  Legalization would also 
remove the direct and collateral sanctions that currently fall so harshly 
upon minority and low-income marijuana users.  With respect to deterring 
use in children, the unknown of legalization might be preferable.  Starting 
from a position of strict prohibition and benefiting from the knowledge 
gained in reducing underage tobacco use, if marijuana is taken off the 
streets and put in the hands of regulatory agencies, it may be possible to 
create and maintain a system at least as effective at deterring underage use 
as the one we have now.  At the very least, legalization of marijuana is a 
viable option that should be given serious consideration. 
The national marijuana debate is not going away.  In fact, it may be 
just getting started as the use of marijuana becomes more acceptable to the 
mainstream population.  For example, recreational drug use by presidential 
candidates has been a topic of discussion in several of the most recent 
presidential elections.205  In the years since President Clinton first ran for 
                                                                                                                          
202 But see Nizza, supra note 135 (noting that misdemeanor marijuana possession arrests in 
Denver have increased by fifty percent since 2004 and during that time two ballot initiatives have 
passed making such offenses the lowest priority for city law enforcement). 
203 This Note focuses on the current policy of decriminalization, which removes sanctions only for 
personal use while leaving in place all prohibitions on production and distribution.  This is not the only 
form decriminalization can take.  Other possibilities include allowing limited cultivation for personal 
use and allowing not-for-profit exchanges for small quantities. 
204 See KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 280 (positing that while legalization of marijuana is certainly 
not a risk-free solution, “it seems more likely than not that some form of restricted licit availability 
represents our least-bad alternative for dealing with the most widely used illicit drug”). 
205 See Gail Collins, Op-Ed, Barack’s Blast from the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at A23, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing ways in which campaigns address past drug 
use of candidates). 
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the presidency, the defensive posture for those candidates with drug use in 
their past has moved from a denial of inhaling marijuana smoke to an open 
discussion by then-Senator Barack Obama about his use of marijuana and 
other drugs.206 
The full range of public policy implications associated with legalizing 
and regulating marijuana is beyond the scope of this Note.  The purpose of 
this Note is not to conclusively determine that legalization is the best 
policy, but to demonstrate that it is a viable alternative, and to further 
advance the marijuana policy debate. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
206 See id. (“There are lots of different ways for a presidential candidate to deal with the question 
of drug use.  You can admit it, deny it or say you didn’t inhale.”). 
